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THE CONFERENCE PRELIMINARIES 
The 1927 Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference was an 
attempt to continue the naval disarmament policies begun in 
1922. The horrors of World War I had impressed upon the 
leaders of Europe the need for a limitation of armaments. 
The first step was taken in Washington D.C. in 1921-1922. 
France, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States 
drew up an agreement limiting battleship and aircraft carrier 
tonnage. A ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 was placed on these 
vessels, giving the united States and Great Britain parity, 
Japan three-fifths of the Anglo-American total and France and 
Italy 1.67. The success of the conference in placing 
restrictions on tonnage levels and a holiday on construction 
was heralded as a great step forward in the search for perma-
nent world peace. Unfortunately because of French recalci-
trance, the Washington Conference participants failed to 
extend this limitation to auxiliary craft (cruisers, flotil-
la leaders, destroyers), or submarines. The most they could 
do was to place a 10,000 ton limit upon individual cruisers 
with a maximum of eight inches for gun calibre. The Americans 
suggested a limit of 450,000 tons for auxiliary vessels but 
Great Britain did not want numerical restrictions placed on 
cruisers. The British argued that their "special needs" 
precluded any limitation on these vessels and stressed their 
2 
1 desire for freedom in construction in this category. 
During the years following the Washington Conference 
recommendations were made for another conference to limit 
auxiliary vessels. As early as January 1923 such requests 
had been included in naval appropriation bills submitted to 
Congress and subsequent bills in the ensuing years continued 
to express the desire for another conference. 2 Despite these 
efforts the United States continued its building program. 
In December 1924 Congress authorized the construction of 
eight cruisers. These vessels were to displace 10,000 tons, 
be armed with eight-inch guns, and to be completed by 1 July 
1927. Although appropriations were made for these cruisers 
in 1925 and 1926, by 1927 the United States had completed 
only two of these ships, with three others under 
lFor the official record of the Washington Conference 
see, Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Arma-
ment, Washington: 12 November - 6 February 1922, 67th \I 
Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: United States Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1922). A good secondary account of 
the conference is Thomas H. Buckley's, The United States and 
the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville, Tennessee: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1970). 
2 . d Un~te States Statutes at Large, Vol. 42, pt. 1 (April 
1921 - March 1923), 67th Congress, 4th Session (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1923), pp. 
1153-54. For subsequent calls for a naval conference see 
Ibid., Vol. 43, pt. 1 (December 1923 - March 1925), 68th 
Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1925), pp. 203-205, 719, 
880-881. 
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construction. 3 
The other signatories of the Washington Treaty were also 
busy. The British Admiralty had worked hard during the first 
few years after the Washington Conference to commence a 
program for cruiser building. By 1925 the British had plans 
for starting twenty cruisers, which included nine heavy 
cruisers of 10,000 tons and eight lighter vessels of 8,000 
tons. 4 Great Britain's activity during this period has led 
one historian to conclude that "in point of numbers, it 
was Great Britain who set the pace of cruiser construction 
during these years."S 
Nor was Japan left behind. By 1924 Japan had completed 
six cruisers. This flurry of ship-building prompted another 
historian to charge that in reality it was Japan which "forced 
the pace in naval expansion in the early post-conference 
30n 21 May 1926 Congress appropriated funds for the 
construction of three more of the eight cruisers authorized 
in December 1924. This raised the total under construction 
to five. Ibid., Vol. 44, pt. 2 (December 1925 - March 1927), 
69th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: United states 
Government Printing Office, 1927), pp. 612-614. 
4"The Naval Problem," Round Table 18 (March 1928): 235. 
For a discussion of the Admiralty's maneuvering to accomplish 
this building program see James Harold Mannock, "Anglo-
American Relations, 1921-1928" (Ph.D. dissertation, Prince-
ton University, 1962), pp. 235-39. Hereafter cited as 
Mannock, "Anglo-American Relations." 
5Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey~ of International Affairs, 
1927 (London: Oxford University ~ress, 1929), p. 30. Here-
after cited as Toynbee, Survey. For a table showing auxiliary 
vessel construction through 1 February 1927 see Ibid., p. 32. 
The table is accurate except for giving the United States five 
cruisers built, the correct figure is two. 
4 
. d ,,6 perl.o . . • . During the next three years, however, the 
Japanese launched no additional cruisers, although they 
projected four more 10,000 ton cruisers. 7 
While the respective naval personnel of the three 
countries struggled for increased ship construction, im-
portant personalities sought to renew the disarmament spirit. 
As early as March 1924 Frank B. Kellogg, then Ambassador to 
Great Britain, had discussed such a possibility with Prime 
Minister Ramsay MacDonald. 8 Although nothing came of these 
conversations, Kellogg renewed the subject in February 1925 
with Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. During these informal talks Chamberlain intimated 
that Great Britain might be interested in a new naval 
conference. He warned, however, that if another conference 
were called, "it would be wise to quietly sound out the 
different governments in advance so that there would be no 
failure.,,9 On the strength of that information, Secretary of 
6Hector C. Bywater, Navies and Nations: A Review of Naval 
Developments Since the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1927), p. 205. 
7 Toynbee, Survey, p. 30. 
8Kellogg to Hughes, 27 March 1924, State Department 
500.A12/8 as quoted in Mannock, "Anglo-American Relations," 
p. 249. 
9Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1925, Vol. 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 3-
9. Hereafter cited as FRUS, 1925. 
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State Charles Evans Hughes solicited the sentiment of the 
other Washington Treaty powers. France quickly spoke out 
against any conference limited only to naval armaments 
and the matter slipped into the background. IO 
Six months later on 25 October 1925, President Coolidge 
suddenly revived the issue with the announcement at a 
press conference that he was willing to call a new naval 
conference. II Once again foreign diplomats were to ascertain 
the opinion of their governments. But the European powers 
had already started their own negotiations. During October 
through December 1925 Germany, Belgium, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy met at Locarno to thrash out some of the 
remaining issues of the Versailles Treaty. While the resulting 
pact was weak, offering only a temporary solution to Franco-
German land disputes, it did represent an initial attempt by 
the European powers to confront their problems without the 
assistance of the United States. As Alanson Houghton, 
Kellogg's successor as Ambassador to Great Britain, aptly 
remarked: "The feeling is that at Locarno the European powers 
reached a friendly understanding without our help and that now 
10Ibid., p. 10. Kellogg replaced Hughes on 4 March1925. 
llCalvin Coolidge, Press Conferences (Lacrosse, Wiscon-
sin: National Micropublishing, 1971). Hereafter cited as 
Coolidge Press Conferences. These may be found in the Iowa 
State University Library, Ames, Iowa. 
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they are in a position to regulate armament among them-
selves. • . " Houghton stressed that since the United 
States was not a member of the League of Nations, the Euro-
peans would resent American initiative in calling a new 
conference on land armament limitation. He believed that 
limitation of naval armaments as a separate subject had a 
better chance, but still cautioned that this also was a 
12 
touchy area. 
With Houghton's cautious attitude in mind, President 
Coolidge muted his remarks. In his Annual Message to 
Congress in December 1925, Coolidge tactfully suggested that 
if the problem of land disarmament could be solved, the 
United States would be willing to call a conference for naval 
disarmament. He stated, however, that the United States 
would "not care to attend a conference which from its loca-
tion or constituency would in all probability prove 
futile.,,13 Coolidge evidently hoped any future conference 
would be held in the United States which would, if success-
ful, greatly add to his accomplishments. But with the advent 
of the Locarno meeting and the steady growth of the League 
of Nations, the focus of disarmament negotiations shifted to 
the other side of the Atlantic. 
12 FRUS, 1925, p. 12. 
13· ... Ib~d., p. X~~~. 
7 
The League, having gained in strength and prestige during 
the 1920's, turned its attention in 1925 to the knotty prob-
lem of disarmament. The members of the League created a 
Preparatory Commission to lay the groundwork for a general 
disarmament conference. The United States was invited, and 
its acceptance stemmed principally from a sense of duty. 
secretary Kellogg was not greatly interested in land dis-
armament, which was a regional question, but naval disarma-
ment received more attention. He was willing to hold another 
naval conference, preferably in the United States, but 
realized that the time was not right for Washington to 
initiate a new conference. Kellogg remained convinced, 
however, that the United States must' "keep our skirts clear" 
of involvement in the Commission in such a manner that they 
would be blamed for any resultant failure. 14 
In May 1926 the first session of the Preparatory Com-
mission began. The United States sent as its chief repre-
sentative Hugh Gibson, minister to Switzerland. During the 
first meetings Gibson informally discussed with Viscount 
Robert Cecil, his British counterpart, the possibility of a 
separate conference where the five signatories of the Five 
- l4Kellogg to Houghton, 11 February 1926, Frank B. Kellogg 
Papers. These are located at the Minnesota State Historical 
Society, St. Paul, Minnesota. For an overview of the work of 
the Preparatory Commission see, John W. Wheeler-Bennett, 
Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925-1931 (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1973), pp. 43-103. 
8 
Power Treaty might extend the limitation to auxiliary vessels. 
Cecil cautioned that such conversations should be kept quiet 
at the present time so as not to harm the work of the Prep-
aratory Commission. He conceded, however, that the British 
would probably be willing to attend a naval conference if the 
Commission failed to limit naval armaments. 15 In July 1926 
the British Cabinet gave Cecil permission to hold more in-
formal talks with the Americans at Geneva. 16 In September 
Cecil and Gibson reviewed the topic,17 which resulted in the 
British informing Esme Howard, the United Kingdom's Ambassador 
in Nashington, that they were willing to participate in a new 
naval conference if the united States were to summon one. 18 
While debate continued privately, Secretary of State 
Kellogg made the issue public in a speech given at Plattsburgh, 
15Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1926, Vol. 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 
104-5. Hereafter cited as FRUS, 1927. 
l6Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet Minutes 
23, Vol. 54, 28 July 1926. The Cabinet Minutes will here-
after be cited as 23/ and the volume number. 
l7W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, 
eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 
Series lA, Vol. 2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1968), p. 397. 
18 b' 87 I l.d., p.O. 
9 
New York, on 18 August 1926. "I have stated before and I 
reiterate that the United States would be glad to cooperate 
with the other naval powers in extending the principles of 
the Washington Treaty to other classes of naval vessels, and 
I earnestly hope that such a m~~sure may soon be practi-
cable.,,19 
Not everyone agreed with the wisdom of another naval 
conference. In September 1926, Lord Astor warned Kellogg that 
"It would be dangerous indeed, perhaps disastrous, to hold 
any public conference unless you were already certain that 
there was agreement about the fundamental basis of the 
solution." He noted the less cooperative climate of 1926. 
The growth of the League of Nations and the haggling over war 
debts had strained relations between the Allies. The per-
ceptive Astor predicted that the debate would probably center 
on such "niggling" points as numbers of cruisers and Britain's 
ability to police its Empire. The Englishman concluded that 
all of these problems could be handled, but stated that it was 
the "course of statesmanship to make sure that an agreement 
about them" was possible prior to a public conference. 20 
In November 1926 Hugh Gibson informed Kellogg that the 
time was right to summon the naval conference. After 
19New York Times, 19 August 1926, p. 1. 
20Astor to Kellogg, 16 September 1926, Kellogg Papers. 
10 
touching briefly on problems that faced the commission, 
Gibson remarked that "both the British and the Japanese have 
shown a clear tendency to come nearer to our point of view." 
The American "point of view" was based on the belief that 
naval disarmament should be limited by total tonnage in each 
class of vessels; i.e., cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. 
France, Italy, and other small nations that favored limita-
tion by total tonnage of the entire fleet strongly opposed 
this plan. They wanted each power to have the freedom to use 
its allotted tonnage for the construction of a single 
category; e.g., submarines. Gibson was pleased that the 
larger powers seemed to agree with the United States and 
intimated that now would be a good time to press for a second 
naval conference. "It seems to me that the next steps can 
best be made from Washington and that they can be made with 
little risk.,,21 Gibson had added an important voice to the 
pressure building on Coolidge to call a new conference. 
Other pressures came from Congress. During 1926 men such 
as Congressman Thomas Butler, Chairman of the House Naval 
Affairs Committee, constantly pushed for more naval construc-
tion. In 1921, Butler charged, the United States had been 
"fooled" into relinquishing its opportunity to attain naval 
supremacy. Instead, it had blundered into giving the British 
2lGibson to Kellogg, 8 November 1926, Ibid. 
11 
parity, which was now slipping away to Britain's rapid con-
struction of cruisers. Although the Naval Appropriation Bill 
of 1924 had authorized building eight new cruisers, only 
five of these had been funded by December 1926. Butler 
complained that Great Britain had restored naval supremacy 
and the United States was now due its right to partiy by 
building more auxiliary vessels. 22 During December 1926 
the navalists indicated they would not only demand appropria-
tions for the remaining three cruisers but also press for a 
substantial increase in cruiser construction. President 
Coolidge, however, was not impressed with these arguments. 
He dismissed them as mere rhetoric and remained convinced that 
the navy was still in good shape. 23 He had supported the 
Preparatory Commission in the hope that international dis-
armament would allow him to cut United States spending in 
armaments. 24 His desire for a balanced budget did not in-
clude large expenditures for defense. He again voiced his 
opposition to continued naval competition in December 1926. 
22Thomas Butler, "Don't Give Up the Ships," North 
American Review 224 (August 1927) :214-22. 
23In February 1926 Coolidge stated that the armed forces 
were not perfect, but were still in good condition. This was 
in reply to naval reports that the navy was becoming obsolete 
and needed replacement vessels. Coolidge Press Conferences, 
2 February 1927. 
24New York Times, 31 August 1926, p. 17. 
12 
In his Annual Message to Congress on 7 December, Coolidge 
emphatically stated his opposition to "engaging in any 
attempt at competition in armaments." He added that at 
Geneva the united States had expressed its willingness to 
"enter into treaties for the limitation of all types of 
warships according to the ratio adopted at the Washington 
Conference. This offer is still pending.,,25 The next day the 
President reiterated this point in his Budget message. "This 
country is now engaged in negotiations to broaden our 
existing treaties ... I feel that it would ..• not [be] 
in keeping with out attitude toward these negotiations to 
commence construction of these three cruisers.,,26 
The navalists' answer was the Butler Bill. Introduced in 
the House on 18 December, it called for the funding and 
construction of ten more 10,000 ton cruisers, stating that 
the necessary funds would be sought from the current session 
27 of Congress. Coolidge immediately issued a statement 
declaring that he was opposed to appropriations for the 
three cruisers left from the 1924 authorization, and he im-
plied that he might be opposed to the Butler Bill in its 
original form without any appropriations attached. This 
25 . FRUS, 1926, p. XX1V. 
26New York Times, 9 December 1926, p. 2. 
27New York Times, 20 December 1926, p. 1. 
13 
action stirred the Navy Department, which attempted to 
convince the President that the ten cruisers were essential 
to the building program of the united States. Coolidge 
agreed that the cruisers would be necessary to "round out" 
the American fleet, but remained opposed to appropriating 
funds for any cruiser construction in 1927. 28 The navalists 
had failed to convince the President to support the cruiser 
program. They decided, therefore, to bypass him and have 
Congress approve the appropriations. 
A bitter fight over the necessity of these new cruisers 
consumed the month of January. After extended debate the 
Senate voted on 1 February to appropriate 1.2 million dol-
lars for the construction of the final three cruisers 
authorized in 1924. Three weeks later the House also ap-
proved the bill, but trimmed the figure to $450,000. Faced 
with this situation, Coolidge accepted defeat and signed the 
29 amended bill on 2 March. 
Sometime during the debate, Coolidge evidently concluded 
28Coolidge Press Conferences, 24 December 1927. 
29New York Times, 25 February 1927, p. 1; Ibid., 3 March 
1927, p. 14. For the text of the 2 March 1926 Naval Ap-
propriations Bill see united States Statutes at Large, Vol. 
44, pt. 2 (December 1925 - March 1927), 69th Congress, 2nd 
Session (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1927), pp. 1295-96. For an examp~e of the Big-
Navy argument see, Thomas Butler, "Don't GJ.ve Up the Ships," 
North American Review 224 (August 1927) : 214-22.' 
14 
that in order for the united States to refrain from con-
tinued competition he would have to call another naval 
conference. The Preparatory Commission had evidenced little 
progress, and another method seemed necessary to limit naval 
expansion. One historian has stated that at a Cabinet meeting 
on 1 February "it was unanimously agreed that the naval powers 
should try to arrive at a new limitation agreement. . " 30 
It is doubtful that this meeting provided the impetus since 
Gibson had been hard at work drafting the proposed invita-
t ' f 1 k ' t ' d l' 31 h " 10n or severa wee s pr10r 0 1ts e 1very. Suc act1v1ty 
by Gibson leads one to conclude that Coolidge had decided on 
his course sometime in December or January and the final pas-
sage of the cruiser appropriations only served as the 
catalyst. 
The President realized that France and Italy would probably 
refuse a direct and public invitation. He opted for the more 
indirect approach and on 3 February privately notified each 
30Mannock, "Anglo-American Relations," p. 251. Mannock 
gives no source for this information and this writer was un-
able to find any record of this Cabinet meeting. If Mannock 
is correct, the Cabinet decision would coincide neatly with 
the Senate's decision to pass the three-cruiser appropriation 
bill. 
3lGibson to his mother, 11 February 1927, Hugh Gibson 
Papers. Gibson's papers are located at the Hoover Presiden-
tial Library and at the Hoover Institution for War, Revolu-
tion, and Peace, Stanford University. For more on Gibson's 
diplomatic career see Ronald Emil Swerczek, "The Diplomatic 
Career of Hugh Gibson, 1908-1938" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Iowa, 1972). 
15 
participant of the Washington Treaty of his intention to call 
a ne~ conference. He suggested that all of the Washington 
signatories informally discuss the prospects of naval dis-
armament at the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission 
scheduled for March 1927. Believing that land disarmament 
was a regional problem, Coolidge suggested that naval arma-
ments could be dealt with effectively by a limited group of 
nations. Coolidge thus issued a formal invitation to discuss 
the question of naval limitation at the next meeting of the 
Commission. He stressed that the discussions would not be 
formal nor an attempt to interrupt the negotiations of the 
Commission, but would only serve to aid the Commission in 
achieving a final conference dealing with all areas of dis-
armament. Coolidge intimated that while the United States 
had no concrete proposals to this end, it would be disposed 
to accept an extension of the Washington Treaty ratio of 
5:5:5 to auxiliary vessels. 32 It is important to note that 
Coolidge's invitation did not suggest a separate conference. 
His only intention was to have informal discussions with the 
idea that some agreements could be made among the naval powers 
320epartment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1927, Vol. 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 
2-5. Hereafter cited as FRUS, 1927. This is also found in 
Congress, Senate, Records of the Conference for the Limitation 
of Naval Armament, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Docu-
ment No. 55 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1928), pp. 3-6. Hereafter cited as 
Conference Records. 
16 
that would in turn contribute to the overall success of the 
Preparatory Commission. 
On 10 February the invitation was made public and Congress 
received a note explaining Coolidge's reasons for summoning 
the conference. Stressing that the United States had always 
viewed competitive armaments as "one of the most dangerous 
and contributing causes of international suspicion and dis-
cord ... calculated eventually to lead to war," Coolidge 
added that he had become aware of sentiment in the United 
States urging further naval construction to keep up with the 
other Washington Treaty countries. "In such sentiments lies 
the germ of renewed naval competition," and the President 
decided that a frugal economy and such construction were in-
'bl 33 compatl e. If he could not stop Congress from passing 
cruiser appropriations, then he would provide an opportunity 
for disarmament by international conference. 
During the days following the public announcement of the 
conference, Coolidge repeated that the conference was not to 
be a separate meeting, but "merely supplementary" to the 
Preparatory Commission. 34 Despite such assurances, France 
33FRUS , 1927, p. 609; Conference Records, pp. 1-3. 
This citation will also be found in the microfilm edition of 
the Calvin Coolidge Papers, Reel 170, the Hoover Presidential 
Library, West Branch, Iowa. 
34coolidge Press Conferences, 11 and 15 February 1927. 
17 
viewed the new conference as an unnecessary diversion from 
the work of the Commission and notified the United States on 
15 February that it would not attend. Seeing nO reason to 
segregate the naval from the other disarmament questions, 
the note stressed that the Commission had full authority to 
deal with all disarmanent questions. A separate conference 
would only "weaken the authority of the League of Nations so 
essential to the peace of the world. " 35 
The Japanese meanwhile gave hope for the conference by 
indicating on 19 February their acceptance of the invitation. 
They requested, however, that because of the importance of 
such discussions the conference should not begin until, at 
the earliest, 1 June. Their delegates would thus have an 
opportunity to confer with authorities in Tokyo before 
making the long trip to Geneva. 36 Of course, a delay in the 
conference would probably make the naval discussions inde-
pendent of the Commission, scheduled to adjourn in May. 
On 21 February, Italy declined the, invitation because its 
navy was "already insufficient to the needs of its defense" 
and it would thus be impossible to participate in any further 
limitation. 37 The Italians were concerned about the French 
35FRUS , 1927, pp. 10-12; Conference Records, pp. 7-9. 
36FRUS , 1927, pp. 13-14; Conference Records, pp. 9-10. 
37FRUS , 1927, pp. 14-16; Conference Records, pp. 10-12. 
18 
Navy and the situation in the Mediterranean where both 
countries were vying for security and control. Any further 
disarmament, they felt, would only serve to weaken the 
Italian position in relation to France. 38 
The British were the last to reply. The Admiralty had 
spent several months prior to Coolidge's invitation working 
on a plan for naval disarmament. William Bridgeman, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, had presented this plan, which in-
eluded a call for another conference, to the Cabinet a week 
before Coolidge's announcement. 39 Viscount Cecil, becoming 
fatigued with the "interminable" discussions at Geneva, had 
also pressed Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin to call a 
"~'Vashington-type conference" to consider extending the 
principles of the 1922 Treaty.40 The Coolidge invitation 
rendered further consideration unnecessary. After consulting 
the Dominions, the British gave their acceptance on 25 
February. Incorporated in the note was the following clause 
38Evidently Mussolini had been in favor of attending the 
conference, but was overruled by his naval advisors who feared 
further gains by the French in the Mediterranean Sea area. 
For more on this see William R. Castle to Hugh Gibson, 9 
March 1927, William R. Castle Papers. These papers are 
deposited in the Herbert Hoover Presidential ,Library, West 
Branch, Iowa. See also FRUS, 1927, pp. 17-18. 
39Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 5th series, 210 (1927) :2189. 
40Cecil to Baldwin, 4 February 1927, Stanley Baldwin 
Papers, Vol. 130, pp. 4-9, as quoted in Stephen Roskill, 
Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol. 2, 1919-1931 (London: Collins, 
1972), p. 438. 
19 
which, because of British insistance, dominated the later 
proceedings: 4l 
The view of His Majesty's Government upon the special 
geographical position of the British Empire, the length 
of inter-imperial communications, and the necessity for 
the protection of its food supplies are well known, and 
together with the special conditions and requirements of 
the other countries invited to participate in the con-
versation must be taken into account. 
Since Italy and France had opted out of the conference, 
the question was whether to proceed with a tripartite rather 
than the intended five-power conference. On 1 March Presi-
dent Coolidge "almost upset the apple cart" by telling the 
press corps of his serious doubts about the value of a three-
power conference. 42 This created a stir in the State Depart-
ment who were having enough problems with the temporary 
41W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, 
eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series 
lA, Vol. 3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), 
p. 578. See also Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 5th series, 203 (1927) :29-30. For the 
British official discussion of Coolidge's invitation see 
Cab 23/55, 16 February 1927. 
42coolidge Press Conference, 1 March 1927. For State 
Department reaction see Castle to Gibson, 9 March 1927, 
Castle Papers. On 8 March Coolidge explained that he had 
"really" meant that it did not seem as practical to "secure 
results from a three-power conference as it would from a 
five-power conference." Coolidge indicated that he was still 
in favor of holding a three-power conference. If that was 
the best that could be done. Ibid., 8 March 1927. 
20 
absence of Secretary Kellogg. 43 On 5 March Assistant 
Secretary William Castle and Undersecretary Joseph Grew 
proposed to Coolidge that the governments of Japan and Great 
Britain be approached about the possibility of a three-power 
conference. Grew averred that if a three-power conference 
were held, Italy would probably find it difficult to resist 
attending. 44 On 8 March, the Japanese and British replied 
to Washington's overture that they would attend a three-power 
meeting. The Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval 
Armament had become a reality.45 
During the rest of March the State Department pressed 
France and Italy to participate. France was reminded that 
Coolidge's original intention had been only to supplement the 
work of the Preparatory Commission and not to undermine its 
authority. Italy was assured that the United States had no 
plans to limit the armaments of the Italians46 and that an 
43coolidge had ordered Kellogg to take a vacation and 
the Secretary was absent from Washington during the latter 
part of February and early March. L. Ethan Ellis, "Frank B. 
Kellogg: 1925-1929," in An Uncertain Tradition: American 
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman A. 
Graebner (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), p. 151. 
44Joseph c. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of 
Forty Years, 1904-1945, ed., Walter Johnson, 2 Vols. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1:694-96. 
45FRUS , 1927, pp. 26-27. 
46FRUS , 1927, pp. 28-31; Conference Records, pp. 12-14. 
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agreement reached at Geneva would carry provision for future 
reconsideration. Both governments nevertheless, remained 
adamant. 47 
With the conference a certainty the next questions were 
when and where to hold it. Coolidge's original suggestion 
that it be held in conjunction with the meeting of the 
Preparatory Commission no longer seemed relevant. On 6 April 
Japan expressed its desire for a further postponement re-
questing that the meeting be delayed until after 11 June. 48 
President Coolidge subsequently set 20 June as the opening 
date. 49 
As for location, on 15 April Bridgeman had informally 
expressed to Gibson his preferences; Brussels or the Hague. 
The British argued that both cities were nearer to London and 
thus would facilitate communication with the British Govern-
mente Gibson, who had become Ambassador to Belgium in the 
Spring of 1927, offered no objections. The conferees could 
reduce their expenses by using his offices and accommodations 
during the conference. In any case, Gibson thought that the 
initiative for a change of site should come from either 
47FRUS , 1927, pp. 31-32, 39; Conference Records, pp. 15-
16. In their reply the Italians reserved the right to send 
an "observer" to the conference. 
48 FRUS, 1927, p. 33. 
49coolidge Press Conferences; FRUS, 1927, p. 40. 
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Great Britain or Japan, so that the United States would not 
be blamed for trying to disrupt the deliberations at Geneva. 50 
On 28 April, Chamberlain announced that his government 
desired the conference to remain in Geneva. The Japanese 
agreed and Geneva became the site. 5l 
While the civilian members of the participating govern-
ments wrestled with these problems, the naval departments 
prepared for the actual negotiation. In March 1927, Secretary 
of the Navy, Curtis Wilbur, directed the Navy General Board 
to prepare a report outlining the American position to be 
used at the conference. By May the General Board had com-
?leted its assignment. The proposals were based on the 
fundamental principles developed after the Washington Con-
ference. American naval policy was reduced to a single 
sentence: 52 
50Gibson to Castle, 15 April 1927, Castle Papers; FRUS, 
1927, pp. 35-36. 
5lBritish Documents, p. 591. Chamberlain privately 
credited Gibson with wanting the conference moved to Belgium. 
"[He] is probably tired of Geneva by this time and would like 
to be in his Embassy again," Chamberlain to Cecil, 4 May 1927, 
Cecil of Chelwood Papers, Additional Manuscripts No. 51079. 
Cecil's Papers are deposited in the British Library, London, 
England. See also Great Britain, Public Record Office, Com-
mittee of Imperial Defense, Minutes, (Cab 2), Vol. 5. Here-
after cited as Cab 2/5. 
52For the General Board Report this writer relied on the 
work of William F. Trimble, "The United States Navy and the 
Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armanent, 1927" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1974). Here-
after cited as Trimble, "Geneva Conference." The report may 
be found in the Navy Department, General Records, Confidential 
Correspondence, A 19, Record Group 80, Archives, as quoted in 
Ib id ., p. 126. 
23 
To create, maintain and operate a Navy second to none 
and in conformity with the ratios for capital ships es-
tablished by the Treaty for Limitation of Naval Arma-
ments. 
The General Board stated that the 5:5:3 ratio was the only 
basis for a just treaty. Equality with Great Britain was 
to be an essential part of any disarmament treaty. The 
Board opposed, therefore, any revision of battleship or air-
craft carrier limitation. In line with its demands for 
parity, the General Board also recommended that four cate-
gories of auxiliary vessels be considered: cruisers, de-
stroyers,submarines, and vessels excempt from limitation. 
It suggested limitation by total tonnage in each class and 
emphasized that the United States would accept as low a 
total tonnage in each class as was agreeable to the other 
powers. The Board defined each class as follows: (1) 
cruisers were those vessels with displacement between 3,000 
and 10,000 tons; (2) destroyers were those with tonnages 
between 600 and 3,000 tons; (3) submarines were vessels 
capable of submergence; (4) the exempt category were those 
vessels of negligible combatant value. The Board assigned 
to Great Britain and the United States a total cruiser ton-
nage of 250,000 to 300,000 tons, and to Japan 150,000 to 
180,000 tons. It limited the United States and Great Britain 
to a destroyer displacement tonnage of 200,000 to 250,000 
tons, and Japan to 120,000 to 150,000 tons. It set submarine 
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tonnage at 60,000 to 90,000 tons for the Anglo-Saxon powers, 
and 36,000 to 54,000 tons for Japan. It left exempt vessels 
free from limitation. The Board had thus retained the 
Washington Conference ratio in its recommendations, leaving 
the United States mathematically equal with Great Britain. 
Although the Board saw parity with the British as a 
primary concern, it did not forget Japan. Believing that 
Japan's goal was the "political, commercial, and military 
domination of the western Pacific," the General Board 
recommended that the United States maintain its Pacific bases 
at maximum strength and retain the 5:3 ratio in ship ton-
nages. 53 The Navy was firmly convinced that Japan was the 
nation the United States most likely would fight in a 
future war. 
The General Board predicted that Great Britain would 
probably seek a greater number of cruisers than any other 
power. This information had been acquired through informal 
discussions in November 1926 and March 1927 between Admiral 
Hilary Jones and members of the British Admiralty. In a 
secret memorandum of 10 November 1926, Jones recorded the 
substance of his conversation with Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord David Beatty. After an hour of general discussion 
53Trimble, "Geneva Conference," p. 128. For more on the 
position of the Navy prior to the conference see Gerald E. 
Wheeler, "The United States Navy and the Japanese 'Enemy': 
1919-1931," Military Affairs, 21 (Summer 1957) :62-64. 
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touching on all classes of vessels, Jones sought one final 
statement from Beatty about the vital issue of parity: 
Before leaving, I said to the First Sea Lord, 'Now, let 
us understand each other perfectly so that there can be 
no doubt as far as the united States is concerned: 
Great Britain accepts equality in all categories. In 
any conference we would establish a level of armaments 
in all categories in which each nation would have an 
equality.' He agreed to that unequivocally. 
Beatty then asked Jones for the American position on the 
issue of reducing maximum tonnage of individual cruisers. 
Jo'nes replied that the United States would object to such 
a reduction because of its need for large cruisers to travel 
long distances between its bases. Jones essentially was 
pleased with the November talks, confident that Great Britain 
would grant full parity to the United States in all types 
of naval vessels. 54 
Jones again held talks with the British in March 1927. 
During these discussions he had an opportunity to speak with 
Vice Admiral Frederick L. Field, who would be the principal 
British naval advisor at Geneva. In reply to Field's as-
sertion that the British would possibly seek a greater num-
ber of cruisers than the United States, Jones reiterated that 
the United States must have parity in all classes with 
54Memorandum, 10 November 1927, Hilary P. Jones Papers, 
Box 4, Library of'Congress, Military Division, as quoted in 
Trimble, "Geneva Conference," p. 117. For the standard 
biography of Lord Beatty see W. S. Chalmers, The Life and 
Letters of David, Ear1,of Beat:ty (London: Hodden and Stoughton, 
1951) • 
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Great Britain: HI ... practically assured him that [parity 
in all classes] would be a sine qua non of any agreement to 
which we would subscribe.,,55 Although the British had now 
been given a strong hint of the American attitude on cruisers, 
it did not seem to materially ~nfluence their plans. 
The British had begun working on their plans for naval 
disarmament several months prior to Coolidge's invitation. 
In 1921 Hughes', proposals had surpri~ed the British, and 
Admiral Beatty decided that at Geneva the British would have 
the advantage. William Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
agreed, and the Admiralty began secretly drafting their for-
mula. 56 
55Jones to Wilbur, 9 March 1927, Navy Department, General 
Board Records, Conference Series, 5, pt. 4, p. 2, as quoted in 
Trimble, "Geneva Conference," p. 119. George Fagan asserts 
in "Anglo-American Naval Relations: 1927-1937" (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1954), p. 22, that a 
copy of this letter could also be found in the personal 
papers of Calvin Coolidge. This is curious because the cita-
tion he gives--MS Coolidge Papers, Box 426, File 2758a, 
Library of Congress--does not exist. Coolidge destroyed the 
majority of this correspondence before he died. After check-
ing with Dwight Miller, Senior Archivist at the Hoover 
Presidential Library, it was determined that Fagan's citation 
was either incorrect or imaginary. Dwight Miller to author, 
7 November 1977. 
56When the conference bogged down after the first few 
meetings, Viscount Cecil complained to Chamberlain: "I am 
afraid the Admiralty made a mistake in insisting upon such 
profound secrecy about our proposals before we came. Un-
fortunately, as they [the Americans] had no guidance as to 
what we were going to propose, they arrived here [in Geneva] 
in a rather suspicious frame of mind •... " Cecil to Cham-
berlain, 24 June 1927, Cecil of Chelwood Papers, ADD. MSS. 
51079. 
27 
On 25 May the Admiralty presented the results of their 
labors to the Cabinet, which approved their extensive pro-
posals. 57 The Admiralty believed that the life of all ves-
sels could be lengthened and that "the limitation placed on 
the armament and displacement of cruisers was unduly and 
unnecessarily large." with respect to battleships, they 
recommended that the gun-calibre be reduced from sixteen 
inches to thirteen and one-half inches, with the tonnage re-
duced from 35,000 to 28,500 tons. Cruisers would have 
their gun calibre reduced from eight inches to six inches, 
with individual tonnage reduced from 10,000 to 7,500 tons. 
The Admiralty divided cruisers into two categories: large 
(10,000 tons), and small (7,500 tons and lower). The large 
cruisers would be used in conjunction with the Fleet at a 
ratio of five cruisers for every three battleships. Great 
Britain and the United States could each possess twenty-
five large cruisers, with Japan having fifteen. It specified 
no tonnage requirement for the smaller cruisers, but stipu-
lated that after calculating the length of sea routes to be 
i 
defended and the density of I trade normally using these routes, 
the British would require a minimum of forty-five small 
cruisers. In the same manner, the United States was allotted 
57Cab 23/55, 25 May 1927. For a detailed record of the 
Committee of Imperial Defense discussions concerning the 
Admiralty proposa~s see Great Britain, Public ~ecord Office, 
Committee of Imperial Defense, Memoranda and M~scellaneous, 
Cab 4/vol. 16, i4 April 1927. Hereafter cited as Cab 4/16. 
The Admiralty proposals may be found in the Committee of 
Imperial Defense Paper No. 808-B, Ibid. 
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twenty-two, and Japan six. This gave the British a total of 
seventy cruisers, large and small, the United States forty-
seven, and Japan twenty-one. These totals, the Admiralty 
emphasized, "are absolute and not relative, and that for 
this reason no reduction on the forty-five for this purpose 
can be accepted." It also opposed any numerical limit on the 
smaller cruisers. Admiral Beatty stated that they would 
accept a limit placed on large cruisers governed by the same 
ratio as battleships, but as for lighter cruisers "they would 
prefer no limitation. uS8 The Admiralty report concluded 
with the recommendation that the destroyer class have a 
numerical limit of 144 and submarines be divided into two 
categories: (1) 1,600 tons of surface displacement; and (2) 
600 f f d ' 1 59 tons 0 sur ace 1SP acement. 
As can be seen from a comparison of the two plans, there 
were striking differences. The British sought to revive 
battleship limitation, a subject the United States did not 
want considered. But the most important difference was the 
method of limiting cruisers. The Americans had determined 
that a simple extension of the Washington Treaty ratio would 
suffice. This would leave each country free to build what 
size of vessel it desired. The British, on the other hand, 
S8Cab 2/5, 20 May 1927. 
59Cab 4/16, 14 April 1927. 
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used a numerical limit for individual units and had not 
determined any total tonnage levels. Reconciling these two 
approaches would be a difficult task, and without a compro-
mise the conference would certainly collapse. 
The two countries had developed their respective proposals 
with an amazing lack of communication between each other. 
The Admiralty, of course, was determined to obtain an ad-
vantage before the conference, and had made little effort to 
discuss the topic with the United States. But there was 
also a paucity of pre-conference diplomacy by the United 
States. Aside from Jone's conversations, there had been in-
formal discussions among the delegates at the Preparatory 
Commission, but they had not fooused their attention on 
specific details. The Office of Naval Intelligence had made 
a cursory study of the Japanese, but had only concluded that 
they would probably desire an increase in their proportion of 
total tonnage. 60 These three instances constituted the 
majority of the pre-conference preparation, and did little to 
prepare each delegation for the proposals that would be 
presented at Geneva. 
Secretary of State Kellogg had however, devoted much time 
60Navy Department, General Board Records, Conference 
Series, 6, Office of Naval Intelligence Report, 30 March 
1927, No. 132, as quoted in Trimble, "Geneva Conference," 
p. 114. 
30 
during the final weeks before the conference trying to choose 
a delegation to represent the United States. In the original 
invitation, Coolidge had suggested that the representatives 
already in Genera be assigned the responsibility. When the 
conference achieved independent status, the British and 
Japanese altered their representation. Japan decided to send 
as its principal delegate Admiral Viscount Makoto Saito, an 
ex-Minister of Marines and Japan's "most ancient and honored 
statesman." Great Britain selected William Bridgeman, a 
Cabinet official, to assist Cecil. With such high-ranking 
officials representing the other two countries, Gibson sug-
gested to Kellogg that possibly Charles Evans Hughes should 
again represent the United States. 6l When the Secretary of 
State and Coolidge tendered the offer, Hughes declined it. 
The former secretary explained that he was too busy, and that 
in any event he thought sending a "leading American statesman 
would draw so much attention to it [the conference] that, 
if we failed to get a treaty, it would be considered as a 
6lGibson to Castle, 15 April 1927, Castle Papers. 
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failure of the Administration. ,,62 Kellogg and Coolidge 
acquiesced and decided to send Gibson and a selected group 
of naval advisors to Geneva. 63 To ease Gibson's burden, 
Kellogg made Admiral Jones a co-delegate. Allen Dulles 
became legal counsel for the ~erican delegation, and on 2 
64 June Coolidge gave the final list of delegates to the press. 
On 1 June Coolidge had met with Gibson and his naval 
advisors to discuss the American proposals. Coolidge 
pointedly asked the navy members if they believed the Navy 
62Kellogg to Houghton, 2 May 1927, Kellogg Papers. 
Castle wrote Gibson on 3 May 1927, recording that Charles 
MacVeagh, Ambassador to Japan, had suggested another pos-
sible reason for Hughes' refusal: " ••• Mr. Hughes did not 
want to go himself because he was afraid the conference 
might be a failure and • • . detract from his glory gained in 
the Washington Conference, that he did not want anyone else 
to go because the conference might succeed and that, there-
fore, he would have to surrender some part of his own kudos. II 
Castle to Gibson, 3 May 1927, Castle Papers. Merlo J. 
Pusey, biographer of Hughes, theorized that Hughes foresaw 
the failure of the conference and was simply not "inclined 
to beat his head against a stone wall when the possibility 
of accomplishment was nil." Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans 
Hughes, 2 Vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 
2:625. 
63FRUS , 1927, pp. 40-41. Under-Secretary of State 
William R. Castle thought Kellogg should head the American 
delegation. He opined that the conference would more likely 
be successful if Kellogg attended. Castle added that if 
Kellogg stayed in Washington during the heat of the summer 
months, he would probably become "intensely irritable and 
we shall have a hopeless time in trying to make him under-
stand what you [Gibson] are driving at." Castle to Gibson, 
3 May 19, Castle Papers. 
64The composition of the American delegation will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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would support a treaty based on them. Upon receiving a 
unanimous reply in the affirmative, Coolidge stated that the 
United States would not agree to a lesser number of 10,000 
ton cruisers than Great Britain, but he predicted an ar-
rangement could probably be worked out which would give the 
United States its tonnage requirements while still allowing 
the British the number they desired of small cruisers. The 
American delegates took this optimism to Geneva. 65 
During the following days, Gibson and his colleagues made 
ready for their departure. Kellogg gave Gibson final instruc-
tions and a review of the American position. He stressed that 
the primary objective of the conference was to negotiate a 
treaty that could further limit naval armanent "in the 
interest of peace and international understanding. n66 With 
these lofty words still echoing in his ears Gibson left for 
Geneva. He shared Kellogg's and Coolidge's optimism, for he 
wrote his mother: "I only hope it will move rapidly and that 
we shall be able to work out something sensible and reason-
able. I think we can." 67 
The historian might find Gibson's confidence to be 
65FRUS , 1927, p. 42. 
66 Ibid ., pp. 43-45. 
67Gibson to his mother, 12 June 1927, Gibson Papers. 
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naive. The American and British delegations approached the 
conference secure in the belief that after short delibera-
tion the other side would willingly accept the program of+ 
fered, and everyone could go home. Unfortunately for all 
concerned, the unfolding of the conference served to empha-
size the intransigence of naval planners on both sides. 
This unwillingness to compromise doomed the Geneva Con-
ference to failure. 
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THE CONFERENCE BEGINS 
The Geneva Conference opened officially at 3:15 P.M. on 
20 June 1927. With the obligatory photographs taken, the 
three delegations seated themselves around the table and the 
1 
conference began. The American delegation totalled seven-
teen members. Eight naval officers assisted the two dele-
gates: Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long, a long-time member of 
the General Board and a good friend of Admiral Jones; 
Admiral Frank H. Shofield, Director of the Navy's Plans 
Division; Captain J. M. Reeves, one of the Navy's pioneers 
in the development of carrier aviation; Captain Arthur J. 
Hepburn, Director of Naval Intelligence; Captain Adolphus 
Andrews, another friend of Admiral Jones; Lieutenant-
Commander Harold C. Train; and Lieutenant-Commander H. H. 
Frost. 2 
Gibson had mixed feelings about his military 
assistants. In a letter to Undersecretary of State William 
Castle, he voiced his dismay at the appointment of Captain 
Andrews. "If they [the Navy] are determined to send over a 
man who has been declared unacceptable I don't propose to 
use up any energy fighting it." Admiral Jones was a 
IFor a critical description of the First Plenary 
Session see Drew Pearson, "Conference First Impressions," 
Trans-Pacific "14 (23 July 1927) :5. 
2Trimble, "Geneva Conference," p. 152; Conference 
Records, p. 17. 
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~I loveable old boy," but, Gibson lamented, "it takes him for-
ever to make up his mind and somewhat longer to explain his 
ideas." Rear-Admiral Long was likeable, but Gibson was a 
little nervous about having him "charged up to my account as 
a capable naval expert." He considered Lieutenant-Commander 
Train "harmless and good-tempered--but a complete blank--
hardly human." Although critical, Gibson really had no 
serious complaints with his naval assistants: U[I would] 
just feel much easier in my mind if I knew we were going 
to have a few wide-awake sailors who could keep me wised up 
and could answer questions put to them during a discussion.,,3 
The British delegation consisted of thirty-eight mem-
bers. The two chief delegates were Viscount Robert Cecil of 
Chelwood, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and William 
Clive Bridgeman, Member of Parliament and First Lord of the 
Admiralty. 4 These two men were members of the British 
Cabinet, and Cecil had led the British at the Preparatory 
Commission. The head delegates were assisted chiefly by 
Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field, Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff; Rear-Admiral A.D.P.R. Pound, who replaced 
Field when he became ill in July and Captain W. A. Egerton. 
3Gibson to Castle, 19 April 1927, Castle Papers. 
4For more biographical information of Cecil see Kenneth 
Rose, The Later Cecils (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1975), pp. 127-85. 
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Each dominion sent four representatives. The Hon. Ernest 
Lapointe attended for Canada, and Sir J. Cook for Australia. 
Sir James Parr and Admiral Lord Jellicoe came from New Zea-
land. Jellicoe, famous for his part in the Battle of 
Jutland in 1916 and former Commander of the British Grand 
Fleet, became a major spokesman for the British naval point 
of view during the conference. 5 J. S. Smith represented 
South Africa, and Kevin O'Higgins, who met a tragic death in 
early July, upheld the interests of the Irish Free State. 6 
Japan also sent a large delegation. Second in size to 
the British with thirty-six members, the Japanese were led 
by two experienced government officials: Admiral Viscount 
Makato Saito, Governor-General of Korea, who had served as 
Navy Minister from 1905-1914; and Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, 
a former Foreign Minister then serving as Ambassador to 
France. Accompanying these men were fifteen naval advisors, 
headed by Vice-Admiral Seizo Kobayashi, and including Rear-
Admiral Kanziro Hara, Captain Teikichi Hari, and Captain 
Teijiro Toyoda. 7 
The delegations elected Hugh Gibson chairman of the 
5The standard biography of Admiral Jellicoe is R. H. 
Bacon's, The Life of John Rushworth Earl Jellicoe (London: 
Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1936). 
6Conference Records, pp. 17-19. 
7I bid., pp. 19-20. 
37 
conference and drafted a message thanking President Coolidge 
for his "humane and wise initiative" in calling the meeting. 
Gibson then read a message from Coolidge calling for an end 
to the armaments race and thanking Japan and Great Britain 
for taking part in the conference. 8 
In his opening speech, Gibson declared that the 
conference was considering the "least intricate phase" of the 
armaments problem and warned that failure to make definite 
progress would be "a serious blow" to efforts being made to 
limit land and air armaments. He listed four major points 
that the Americans considered basic to arms limitation: (1) 
an end to naval competition among the three powers; (2) 
n,avies to be maintained at the lowest level compatible with 
national security; (3) the economic necessity for keeping 
armaments low; and (4) the extension of the Washington 
formula to all categories of combatant vessels of the three 
powers. Accordingly, the United States was prepared to 
accept as low a total tonnage in each class of auxiliary 
vessels as would be acceptable to the other powers repre-
sented. 9 
Gibson then outlined the specific American proposals. 
8 Ibid., p. 23. 
9 Ibid., p. 25. 
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The Washington Treaty ratios of 5-5-3 should be applied to 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. An "escape clause" 
could be added to give the participants the right to revise 
the treaty should an outside power begin building naval 
armaments excessively. In addition, the United States 
desired to exempt from limitation those ships of negligible 
combatant value. The resulting treaty would be coterminous 
with the Washington Treaty. 
Total individual tonnage differentiated the destroyer 
and cruiser classes: cruisers consisting of those surface 
craft displacing between 3,000 and 10,000 tons, and 
destroyers displacing between 600 and 3,000 tons, with a 
speed greater than seventeen knots. All vessels designed to 
operate below the surface of the sea were lumped into a 
single submarine class. Gibson added that all naval require-
ments were relative, meaning that the building programs of 
one power could well-require corresponding programs on the 
part of others. The United States would thus remain flexible 
in its requirements. 
The proposed tonnage allocations in the cruiser, 
destroyer, and submarine classes for each country were as 
follows: 
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Cruiser class: Total tonnage limitation: 
for the United States 250,000 to 300,000 tons 
for the British Empire 250,000 to 300,000 tons 
for Japan 150,000 to 180,000 tons 
Destroyer class: 
for the United States 200,000 to 250,000 tons 
for the British Empire 200,000 to 250,000 tons 
for Japan 120,000 to 180,000 tons 
Submarine class: 
for the United States 60,000 to 90,000 tons 
for the British Empire 60,000 to 90,000 tons 
for Japan 36,000 to 54,000 tons 
Gibson added that_if either Japan or Great Britain wanted 
still lower figures, his government would welcome such 
proposals. " Also, the United States would consider the 
universal abolition of submarines if the other powers so 
desired. 
In conclusion, Gibson stressed that all three powers 
had the right to maintain a naval force sufficient for 
their legitimate defense requirements. Although the 
difficulties of the task before them must not be under-
estimated, the delegates should approach them confidently 
and with the hope that they would find a solution. lO 
William Bridgeman, the next speaker, thanked the League 
of Nations for its hospitality and President Coolidge for 
10Ibid., p. 27. 
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issuing the invitation. He acknowledged the work already 
completed at the Washington Conference and noted that prior 
to the Coolidge invitation he had placed before the Prime 
Minister similar proposals for a naval conference to 
further the efforts of the Washington Conference. ll Bridge-
man stressed the British desire for disarmament and out-
lined the principles upon which their proposals were 
predicated. 
The insular character of Great Britain made it de-
pendent on the seas for the importation of raw materials and 
food supplies, as well as for exports. The realities of long 
coast lines and trade extended routes required an extensive 
network of surface vessels for protection from hostile raids. 
Thus, Bridgeman called for the extension of shiplife for 
capital ships to twenty-six years; of destroyers to twenty 
years; and of submarines to fifteen years. He requested a 
reduction in the individual tonnage of the battleship from 
35,000 tons to under 30,000 tons and the gun size from 
sixteen to thirteen and one-half inches. Aircraft carriers 
from 27,000 tons to 25,000 tons, and their guns from eight 
llThere is no mention of this proposal in the Cabinet 
Minutes for February 1927, but one historian suggests that 
the idea fo~-another naval conference originated with Cecil. 
Stephen Roskill, Hankey, p. 438. Bridgeman's speech is also 
printed in Command Paper 2964, Speeches in Plenary Session 
by the Right Hon. W •. ~. Bridgeman, MP., First Lord of the 
Admiralty (London: His Majesty 1 s Station~ry Office, 1927), 
pp. 2-7. Hereafter cited as Command Paper 2964. 
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inches to six inches. He proposed dividing the cruiser class 
into two sub-classes: 10,000 ton, eight-inch gun large 
cruisers, and a smaller cruiser having a maximum individual 
tonnage of 7,500 tons, carrying a six-inch gun. While the 
5-5-3 ratio on the large cruisers was acceptable to the 
British, Bridgeman believed a different arrangement should be 
followed for the lighter cruisers. 
The British also wanted to divide the destroyer and sub-
marine into two classes: 1,750 ton destroyer leader.s, and 
1,400 ton destroyers with gun limited to six inches; large 
submarines with a maximum tonnage of 1,600 tons, and a smaller 
group limited to 600 tons. Bridgeman added that the British 
would continue their quest for the abolition of the sub-
marine, if the others agreed. 
Bridgeman concluded his remarks noting that the British 
also considered an "escape clause" similar to the American 
proposal necessary to the anticipated treaty. He added 
that the extension of life for ships would "obviously reduce 
very considerably the cost of replacement for us all." He 
hoped that by standardizing the size of future naval craft 
armaments the participants of the Geneva Conference would 
eliminate the danger of renewed competition. 12 
Admiral Saito spoke last. He stressed his government's 
l2Conference Records, p. 31. 
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desire to reach an accord with the United States and Great 
Britain. The Japanese based their proposals on the principle 
that "the requirements of each nation • . • are reflected in 
what that nation possesses actually or in authorized pro-
grammes. For that reason, in a discussion concerning 
auxiliary vessels, adequate consideration must be given the 
existing status of each nation in that particular respect.,,13 
The Japanese thus proposed that none of the participating 
powers adopt any new building programs that would add to 
their existing "naval strength". "Naval strength" was defined 
as total tonnage in any category of auxiliary vessels. The 
Japanese desired the existing naval programs in each country 
to be completed as planned, but no future construction to 
be undertaken during the life of the treaty. They also re-
quested that all ships less than 700 tons, those surface 
vessels carrying no gun over three inches, or no more than 
four guns between three and six inches, and aircraft carriers 
under 10,000 tons be exempt from limitation. Replacement 
age limits for surface auxiliary vessels would be set at 
sixteen years for those above 3,000 tons; twelve years for 
those under 3,000 tons; and twelve years for all submarines. 
Finally provision was made for the scrapping of all excess 
l3 rbid., p. 33. 
43 
tonnage, and regulations established governing the replace-
ment of all ships.14 
The proposals for the limitation of auxiliary vessels 
had been given and the differences between the British and 
American plans were obvious. The Americans had come to 
Geneva with the desire to extend the Washington Treaty ratio 
to these vessels with limitation by total tonnage in each 
class. The British had developed a much more detailed plan 
based on limitation by age, tonnage, and gun size. The 
British also suggested the division of the auxiliaries into 
two sub-classes which was not envisioned by the Americans. 
Another basic difference was the British suggestion to limit 
further battleships and aircraft carriers. This surprised 
the Americans who had been content to postpone consideration 
of this subject until 1931, when there was to be a formal 
review of it. The Japanese proposals were the most general 
of the three, calling for the maintenance of the status quo. 
Saito had left unsaid the Japanese quest for an increase in 
their share of the Washington ratios, evidently hoping to 
gain this during the negotiations. Another important 
point was the Japanese desire to keep each country at its 
present armament level which would aid the Japanese position 
14 ' . Conference Records, 32-34. 
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in the Pacific, and thus placate a public unhappy about the 
inferior status placed upon Japan at the Washington Con-
ference. lS Regardless of these concerns, the Japanese had 
come to Geneva to gain an agreement, and they worked hard 
during the course of the conference to effect that goal. 
Although Anglo-American discrepancies were obvious, 
neither Gibson nor the British anticipated any insurmountable 
difficulties in finding a solution. 16 Gibson summed up the 
situation at the first post-Plenary session press conference: 
"Wellt at any rate, now we have got something we can get our 
teeth into.,,17 
After the Plenary session, both the British and American 
delegations met to scrutinize the proposals. Admiral Field 
predicted that the Americans would object to any discussion 
of battleships. Both Cecil and Bridgeman strongly favored 
further limitation and stated that they would press this 
issue. Field added that the United States had established 
"arbitrary" figures for cruiser limitation which, if carried 
out, would limit Britain to only thirty cruisers. The Ameri-
can destroyer proposals also displeased the British; they 
considered the 3,000 ton maximum limit to be so "high as to be 
of little practical application to present-day 
l6FRUS , 1927, p. 48; British Documents, pp. 605-6. 
l7New York Herald Tribune, 21 June 1927, p. 1. 
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destroyers ... " But the British remained confident of 
success in negotiating a treaty.18 
The Americans also saw problems in the British proposals. 
Admiral Jones was particularly upset, feeling the British had 
shown bad faith after giving what he believed were contrary 
assurances on his last trip to London. Hugh Wilson, who 
attended the conference as Secretariat-General, assumed the 
British had other proposals that were more practical than 
those given and would present them at the next public 
session. l9 The Americans evidently considered the original 
British offer to be so impractical that they could not be 
taken seriously. The British, however, were quite serious, 
as the Americans would soon discover. 
That the conference would ultimately founder on cruiser 
limitation should not detract from the fact that tentative 
agreements were reached in the Technical Committee re-
garding exempt vessels, destroyers, and submarines. This 
committee, consisting of naval experts from each delegation, 
also made progress on capital ships until that question was 
18Great Britain, Public Record Office, Admiralty 166/2609, 
Minutes of the British Empire Delegation, 2nd Meeting, 21 June 
1927. These r.ecords are found in the Rolls Room of the Public 
Record Office. 
19Diary of Hugh Wilson, 21 June 1927. Wilson's diary is 
located in the Hugh Gibson Papers, Box 30, File 1, Herbert 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, 
California. Hereafter cited as Wilson Diary. 
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set aside pending agreement on cruisers. Historians have 
largely ignored these agreements even though they reflected 
large concessions from all sides and were eventually embodied 
in the London Naval Treaty of 1930. 20 They represent the 
successful bargaining that characterized portions of the 
Geneva Conference. Such were the contributions of the 
Technical Committee. 
After the delegations settled down to the business of the 
conference, the first problem that faced them was whether or 
not to review battleship limitation. The British fervently 
pressed for a renewal of this topic, arguing that further 
reduction in capital ship tonnage and armament would greatly 
aid the economies of all governments. The Japanese agreed 
that this might be a worthwhile subject, but needed official 
permission from their government before they could commit 
themselves. 21 The Americans adamantly opposed any considera-
20Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), says the 
conference was a "total failure," p. 109; see also Gerald E. 
Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and 
the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1963), p. 148; and Emma L. Ethan Ellis, Frank B. 
Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925-1929 (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961), pp. 183-84. 
Ernest Andrade, Jr., "United States Naval Policy in the Dis-
armament Era, 1921-1937" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State 
University, 1966), p. 162, states that it is a mistake to 
overlook the agreements made covering classes other than 
cruisers. 
2lBritish Documents, p. 612. 
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tion of further capital ship limitation because the Washington 
Treaty had stipulated that a conference would be called in 
1931 to assess its worth. 22 Despite American arguments to 
the contrary, the British remained convinced further battle-
ship limitation should be pursued. 
As for cruisers, the Japanese initially occupied a 
middleground. They supported the British contention to 
limit large cruisers numerically, but they also saw merit in 
the American call for total tonnage limitation giving each 
country the freedom to build what it desired. This would give 
Japan the opportunity to build as many small cruisers as they 
needed. The Japanese were willing to equivocate until the 
other two powers could come to an agreement on cruisers. 23 
How well the two Anglo-Saxon powers were able to compromise 
their views became the crucial question of the conference. 
The Executive Committee, composed of the chief delegates, 
met informally on 24 June. Discussion was devoted to Technical 
Committee procedures. The British pressed for taking each 
22Kellogg strongly supported Gibson in this position. 
Press Conferences of the Secretaries of State (1922-1973), 
Series 1, F. B. Kellogg and H. L. Stimson: March 1927-
December 1929 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 
Inc., 1974), Reel #3. Hereafter cited as Kellogg Press 
Conferences. The date for this particular item was 25 June 
1927. 
23British Documents, p. 612. 
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class separately in a progression from exempt classes through 
capital ships. The Americans countered that the Technical 
Committee establish general guidelines for the discussion of 
all categories before any specific agreements were conduc-
ted. 24 Finally after two more days of private talks the 
naval assistants worked out a plan to devote each session of 
the Technical Committee to a specific class of vessel and 
reach general agreements wherever possible. 25 
The conference had completed its first week. With the 
weekend approaching the delegates scattered to take advantage 
of the beautiful Swiss countryside. Golf was very popular 
among the delegates, with Gibson, Cecil, and Jellicoe avid 
26 players. Gibson also organized a baseball game between 
the Japanese and the Americans, which resulted in the Ameri-
cans receiving a sound thrashing, 28-8. 27 These activities 
helped to keep relations among the participants less strained 
as the conference grew more tense in the following weeks. 
The Technical Committee resumed negotiations on 27 
24Conference Records, p. 77. 
25Trimble, "Geneva Conference," p. 173. 
26A. C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe 
(London: Collins Publishers, 1938), p. 103. Jellicoe joked 
with reporters after one round of golf with Gibson: "We had 
a jolly good golf--ratio about 5-5." New York Herald 
Tribune, 23 June 1927, p. 2. 
27perrin C. Galpin, ed., Hugh Gibson 1883-1954: Extracts 
from His Letters and Anecdotes from His Friends (New York: 
Belgian-American Educational Foundation, Inc.,1956), pp. 62-
63. 
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June. With the addition of the capital ship question there 
were now five categories under consideration: capital ships, 
cruisers, exempt vessels, destroyers, and submarines. The 
first two raised the greatest difficulties, and will be dis-
cussed later. The last three were less troublesome, and the 
Technical Committee was able to reach tentative agreements. 
Because the Technical Committee meetings became quite tedious 
at times, it is best to give a summary of the provisional 
recommendations as they were formulated and given to the 
Executive Committee. 28 
On 27 June the Technical Committee dealt with exempt 
vessels. 29 After careful deliberation, the following four 
categories of ships were selected as exempt from limitation: 
(1) all surface vessels of less than 600 tons standard dis-
placement; (2) all surface vessels between 600 and 2,000 tons 
having no guns with a greater calibre than 6 inches, or 
mounting more than 4 guns above 3 inches in calibre, or 
fitted for torpedoes and traveling faster than 18 knots; (3) 
all ships not designed as fighting ships or having any fight-
ing ship capabilities such as large guns, heavy armour, or 
28A list of these recommendations is printed in the 
Technical Committee Final Report issued to the Executive 
Committee on 8 July 1927. Conference Records, pp. 197-200. 
2~Ibid., pp. 109-19. 
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the ability to lay mines or land aircraft on board; (4) 
certain existing vessels of special type such as minesweepers. 
The Technical Committee next tackled the destroyer 
class. 30 The initial proposals divided destroyer tonnage 
into destroyers and destroyer leaders. The British sug-
gested 1,750 tons and the United States expressed a desire 
for 2,000 tons as the maximum tonnage for destroyer leaders. 
The Japanese gave no recommendations for destroyer leader 
tonnage, but supported the British in a destroyer tonnage 
limit of 1,500 tons. The Americans countered with a limit of 
1,400 tons. Britain alone offered a gun-calibre limit of 5 
inches. Age for replacement of all destroyers was given as 
16 years, 20 years, and 12 years for the United States, 
Britin, and Japan respectively. 
The committee produced a tentative compromise setting: 
(I) maximum tonnage for destroyer leaders at 1,850 tons; (2) 
maximum tonnage of destroyers at 1,500 tons; (3) gun calibre 
for all destroyers not greater than 5 inches; (4) age limit 
for replacement of new construction at sixteen years; (5) 
sixteen percent of the total tonnage allotted for destroyers 
as applicable for the construction of destroyer leaders; (6) 
the dividing line between all cruiser class and the destroyer 
class at 1,580 tons, with the destroyer class including all 
30Ibid ., pp. 132-47. 
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surface combatant vessels between 600 and 1,850 tons. Neither 
the United States nor Japan preferred to give definite 
figures for total tonnage or numbers for the destroyer class. 
Britain gave its tonnage requirements in the destroyer class 
as 221,600 tons, with no more than 29,000 tons being used for 
destroyer leaders. 3l 
The submarine class represented the last area in which 
there was substantial agreement. On land 2 July, the 
Technical Committee discussed this item. 32 The United States 
proposed a limit of 60,000 to 90,000 tons displacement for 
the United States and Great Britain, between 36,000 and 
54,000 tons for Japan. The British suggested a division of 
the class into a large type ranging in tonnage from 1,000 to 
1,600 tons; and a smaller type to include all submarines 
under 600 tons. The British evidently were not concerned 
with those submarines between 600 and 1,000 tons. The 
Japanese strongly desired having their 700-ton submarines 
exempted, but indicated they would have to wait for further 
information from Tokyo. A few days later, after getting 
word from their government, they withdrew their suggestion 
for this exemption on the condition that special consideration 
be given Japan when the time came for alloating tonnage in 
3lIbid ., pp. 197-98. 
32Ibid., pp. 148-58. 
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this class. 
The Americans suggested 1,700 tons as the maximum ton-
nage for individual submarines. Japan offered a limit of 
2,000 tons, noting that many submarines already existed between 
1,400 and 3,000 tons. The delegations finally compromised with 
1,800 tons as the maximum individual tonnage for a submarine. 
For replacement age the United States proposed thirteen 
years, the British fifteen, and the Japanese twelve. Another 
compromise left the replacement age at thirteen years. By 
the end of the second week the Technical Committee was 
ready with its tentative recommendations for a third class 
of auxiliary vessels. 
Agreement on capital ships and cruisers proved to be 
more elusive. The British had greatly surprised the Ameri-
cans with their battleship proposal. The Americans had not 
even considered the subject as a topic for discussion, and 
for that reason were totally unprepared to deal with it. 33 
Britain had also surprised Japan. Viscount Ishii 
forthwith cabled Tokyo for instructions, and on 27 June, he 
informed Gibson that the delegation had received permission 
to discuss battleships. Dismayed by this reversal, Gibson 
assured Ishii that the Americans would remain firmly against 
33FRUS , 1927, pp. 30-51, 53. 
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including the subject at the present conference. 34 
Gibson carefully outlined the American position to 
Cecil and Bridgeman in a meeting on 23 June. The United 
States opposed any discussion of the Washington Treaty pro-
visions in the absence of two of the participants, Italy 
and France. 35 
The British could not understand the surprise their 
proposal evoked. They argued that in their acceptance of 
Coolidge's invitation, they had indicated a desire to consider 
the Washington Treaty provisions. The reply included a 
British wish to "consider to what extent the principles 
adopted at Washington can be carried further, either as 
regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the 
various powers, or in other important ways. ,,36 Since the 
Americans had accepted the reply without comment, they 
had tacitly accepted the possibility of further battleship 
limitation. 37 Members of the American delegation were 
privately annoyed that such an inference had been drawn,38 
34Ibid ., pp. 60-61. 
35 I bid., p. 49. 
36British Documents, p. 578. 
37London Times, 25 June 1927, p. 12. 
38Toynbee, Survey, p. 49. Toynbee cited the French 
newspaper, Le Temps, 25 June for this insight into American 
thinking. 
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but the British nevertheless believed the battleship dis-
cussion was necessary and pressed their case. 
When the United Kingdom delegation concluded that their 
two counterparts were not taking this subject seriously, 
Bridgeman urged his government to have the British ambassa-
dors to the United States and Japan explain the importance 
of further limitation in battleships. The British saw 
advantages in extending the principles embodied in the 
Washington Treaty: aiding the League of Nations Preparatory 
Commission in achieving better results in future meetings; 
and reducing the burden of expenditures for each country.39 
Esme Howard dutifully articulated these reasons to 
Kellogg. At the same time however, he warned Chamberlain 
that "so far as I can understand the situation, we must walk 
very cannily if we are to avoid a failure of the conference 
and consequent aftermath of recrimination." If the United 
States threatened to terminate the conference over the sub-
ject of British insistence on battleship limitation, they 
should abandon the subject. The issue was not worth that. 40 
Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer, dis-
agreed with the Ambassador. While a Royal Navy enthusiast, 
Churchill was also responsible for the nation's economic 
39British Documents, p. 617. 
40 Ibid ., p. 619. 
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health. For the edification of the Cabinet, he strongly sup-
ported a further reduction of battleships. Great Biitain 
would reali~e great economy if such were done. Churchill 
saw in the American disposition to keep the size of capital 
ships as large as possible a retention of the capacity of 
crossing the Pacific and attacking Japan_ 41 
secretary of state Kellogg was suspicious of the British 
reasons for reviewing capital ship limitation. He explained 
to Coolidge that the British had two new ships--the Rodney 
and the Nelson--nearly completed, each displacing nearly 
35,000 tons. If all new capital ships would not exceed 30,000 
tons, the British would have a marked advantage over the other 
navies. Kellogg remained convinced that the entire topic 
should be postponed until 1931. 42 
On 8 July the Japanese announced that their government 
4l I bid., pp. 627-28. Churchill took an active part in 
the Cabinet discussions pertaining to the conference. He was 
hesitant to support any parity plan and disliked even dealing 
with Coolidge, whom he described as having the "viewpoint of 
a New England backwoodsman." W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, 
and M. E. Lambert, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
1919-1939, Series lA, Vol. 5 (London: Her Majesty's Sta-
tionery Office, 1973), p. 884. Churchill's memorandum is 
also recorded in Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet 
Memoranda, (Cab 24), Vol. 187, Confidential Print 189. This 
record group will hereafter be cited as Cab 24/ the volume 
number: the confidential print number. 
42FRUS, 1927, pp. 63-64; Kellogg Press Conferences, 28 
June 1927. 
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saw merit in renewed battleship limitation, but urged that 
the other matters be concluded before beginning such dis-
cussions. 43 The United States acquiesced. It would discuss 
the matter, but only after the delegates had reached agree-
ment on the other classes of auxiliary vessels. The change in 
American policy reflected the change in Kellogg's attitude. 
The Secretary had decided that the battleship issue was con-
suming an inordinate amount of time, and after visiting 
with the Japanese Ambassador, Matsudaira, who indicated 
Japan's intentions, he concluded that perhaps battleship 
discussions would have some merit in 1927. The Secretary 
agreed, but stipulated that such talks should be informal 
and not interfere with the more important tasks before the 
conference. 44 
On 9 July the British notified the others of their 
decision to postpone discussion of capital ships.45 The 
delegations had now agreed on tentative recommendations for 
limiting four classes of vessels: destroyers, submarines, 
exempt vessels, and capital ships. 
The conference could now direct its full attention to 
43Conference Records, pp. 83-84. 
44British Documents, p. 654. 
45Adm 116/2609. 
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the vexing problem of cruiser limitation, the principal 
reason for convening the Geneva Conference. The question 
would now be answered whether these delegates could improve 
upon the performance of their predecessors in Washington 
in 1922 who could only agree upon a maximum size for cruisers 
and their armament. 
58 
THE CRUISER CONTROVERSY 
Early in the conference the participants failed to ap-
-preciate the difficulties inherent in the cruiser issue. 
After the first Plenary session neither the American nor 
British delegates indicated any problems. Cruisers were 
only part of the total disarmament picture. The assumption 
was that limitations could be imposed here as with other 
classes of auxiliary vessels. At the end of the first week, 
however, the problem began to take form and surface as a 
major point of controversy. 
The British had been initially shocked by the American 
cruisers proposals. Admiral Field had snorted that the 
American formula was "arbitrary" and would relegate to the 
British only thirty cruisers. l The British hoped the Japa-
nese could be won over to their side and support a division 
of the cruiser class into large and small categories. 2 
While the Technical Committee worked on reaching tentative 
limitation recommendations in the other areas, the cruiser 
issue steadily gained in importance as the major roadblock 
of the conference. 
lBritish Documents, p. 609. 
2British Documents, p. 612. The Admiralty had determined 
prior to the conference that Japan would be allowed a maximum 
of nine large cruisers, Cab 4/16, 14 April 1977. 
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secretary Kellogg soon recognized the importance of the 
cruiser issue. After Gibson reported that Admiral Jellicoe, 
seconded by Bridgeman, had stated the amazing British ton-
nage requirements of 500,000 tons for cruisers, Kellogg im-
mediately replied that the United States must remain firm in 
its desire to continue the Washington Treaty ratios and its 
commitment to the proposed tonnages. Kellogg could not under-
stand why Great Britain needed so many cruisers and dismissed 
Jellicoe's large tonnage declaration as an attempt to see how 
serious the Americans were about the principle of parity. 
The Americans were quite serious. Kellogg adamantly declared 
there could "be no question" about parity.3 
Kellogg based the American right to parity with Great 
Britain on a portion of Lord Balfour's speech at the Washing-
ton Conference. Balfour had accepted the American contention 
for a 5-5-3 ratio for battleships and the battle fleet and had 
concluded with the following: 4 
Taking those two as really belonging to one subject, 
namely the battle fleet, taking those two, the battle-
ships themselves and the vessels auxiliary and neces-
sary to a battle fleet, we find the proportion between 
various countries is acceptable •••. 
3 FRUS, 1927, pp. 55-56. 
4congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Arma-
ment, Washington: 12 November 1921 - 6 February 1922, 67th 
Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: United states 
Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 102. 
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The Secretary interpreted this statement to mean that parity 
in all classes of vessels had British approval. But the 
Americans were incorrect, Balfour had agreed only to parity 
in "battleships and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to 
a battle fleet," in other words, those vessels which ac-
companied the battleships. Balfour had said nothing about 
the auxiliary vessels used to maintain the British lines of 
trade and communication. The British thus believed they had 
agreed only to parity with the United States in battleships, 
and in the case of cruisers, only those large cruisers 
assisting the Fleet. They felt under no obligation to ac-
cept parity in the smaller cruisers. Unfortunately, this 
difference in interpretation had not been explained by the 
British, and the Americans thought the British were trying to 
relinquish the equality they had granted at Washington. 5 
The uproar over parity gained momentum during the second 
week of the conference. Kellogg grew increasingly concerned 
that the United States would not be allowed parity in 
cruisers. 6 Bridgeman became upset over the American outcry 
5For examples of American press protests over the parity 
issue see, Wythe Williams, foreign correspondent for the 
New York Times, 21-24 June 1927. 
6Kellogg repeated his position on the parity issue at a 
press conference on 29 June 1927, adding that whatever Great 
Britain demanded for cruisers "we would, of course, demand 
an equal amount,' Kellogg Press Conference. 
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and announced to a hastily gathered press conference on 29 
June that Great Britain had "no intention of contesting the 
principle of parity between the naval strength of the United 
States and Great Britain. • " He expressed surprise that 
the Americans had inferred from British statements any British 
des~re tor supremacy, Wh~le ~eat Britain had certain naval 
requirements, his government did "not deny the right of the 
United States to build up to an equal figure in any type of 
warship if she thought it necessary.,,7 This statement re-
lieved the apprehensions in Washington, with Secretary of 
State Kellogg expressing his gratification at the British 
admission of parity.a 
Some members of the British Government were not so 
pleased. Winston Churchill insisted that the British 
. ought not let ourselves be netted in a scheme 
of parity with the United States in cruisers and other 
ancillaries. There can really be no parity between a 
Power whose Navy is its life and a Power whose Navy 
is only for prestige. Parity for the former is 
supremacy for the latter. 
He admitted that Great Britain had no desire to limit the 
number of cruisers built by the United States. His country 
was going to construct the cruisers it required, and the 
7FRUS , 1927, p. 65. For a verbatim account of Bridge-
man's statement see The Manchester Guardian, 1 July 1927, 
p. 15. 
aNew York Times, 1 July 1927, p. 9. Wythe Williams 
crowed that the American press had "forced" Bridgeman into 
the parity concession, Ibid . ., p. 19: 
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united States could build what it wanted with no British 
interference. 9 Churchill's opinions were readily seconded 
by the Admiralty, and the Cabinet agreed that the British 
government would not "adopt the principle of parity of naval 
strength in so many words, as this was contrary to previous 
policy and was believed to be strongly opposed by the 
Admiralty. ,,10 The Cabinet wired the Geneva delegates an out-
line of the British position: the British meant to build 
enough cruisers to satisfy their needs and laid down no 
t . . .. . 11 res r1ct1ons on Amer1can crU1ser construct1on. 
But problems remained with the parity question. To the 
Americans Bridgeman had conceded parity in all cruisers. He 
had said that n[Britain] has no intention of contesting the 
principle of parity between the naval strength of the United 
States and Great Britain." The Admiralty read the statement 
differently. Technically it had agreed only to parity with 
the United States in the large 10,000 ton cruisers. This was 
in keeping with Balfour's statement at Washington. The 
Admiralty had no intention of conceding equality in the 
9British Documents, p. 627. 
10Cab 23/55, 29 June 1927. The question of parity was 
raised by Lord Balfour without prior notice, which resulted 
in a discussion described by one witness as "confused." 
Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, ed. Keith Middlemas (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 104. 
IlBritish Documents, p. 627. 
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smaller vessels because Britain needed more of these than 
did the United States because of their "special needs." 
American parity versus Britain's "special needs" became and 
remained the basic issue before the conference. 
Bridgeman was soon distressed to learn that the Ameri-
cans had interpreted his statement to mean parity in all 
cruisers. He realized that equality with the United States 
would probably result in Japan demanding a corresponding in-
crease in these vessels. If so, Bridgeman then believed 
"comprehensive agreement on [the] cruiser question [would] be 
impossible." The best chance for success, Bridgeman pro-
posed, would be an agreement on large cruisers, leaving each 
nation free to build what it desired in small cruisers. 12 
Admiral Beatty shared Bridgeman's assessment. If the 
Americans received absolute parity, he was certain the Japa-
nese would increase their tonnage demands. The British could 
not reduce their cruiser requirements without endangering the 
welfare of the Empire, and if America did obtain parity it 
would in reality have supremacy because the United States would 
have no need for so many cruisers. The Admiralty was unable 
to divorce itself from considering the strategic results of 
the United States having-more cruisers than they thought 
necessary~ From the standpoint of the Admiralty, this would 
12 . Ibid., p. 633. 
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give the United States a numerical advantage in a future war. 
Regardless of any future considerations, Beatty finally 
recommended that for the present, the entire issue be dropped; 
the less said, the better. 13 By this time, however, parity 
had become intertwined with the whole cruiser issue and could 
not be disregarded. 
While the higher echelons struggled with the interpre-
tation of equality, the delegates at Geneva sought a compro-
mise. On 28 June the Technical Committee devoted its at-
tention exclusively to cruisers. Admiral Field restated the 
British proposal to divide the class into large and small 
vessels. Large cruisers would be limited numerically by the 
Washington Treaty ratio, while there would be no limit on 
the number of small cruisers. The Americans countered that 
total tonnage be assigned the entire class. The Americans 
dismissed the British suggestion as too costly to be practi-
cal. Field, becoming exasperated, presented his country's 
absolute requirements: fifteen large and sixty light 
cruisers. These seventy-five cruisers would total nearly 
600,000 tons. Jones flatly declared that 600,000 tons was 
uno limitation." Field remained firm, however, stating that 
the British figures Uhad not been arrived at as something to 
13Cab 23/55, ~ July 1927. 
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bargain with but definitely what had always been intended.,,14 
The Geneva delegates, however, had changed the original 
plans proposed by the Admiralty before the conference. The 
number of large cruisers required had been reduced from 
twenty-five to fifteen, and that of small cruisers had 
increased from forty-five to sixty. This increase in the 
number of small cruisers can be explained by the Admiralty's 
desire to slowly phase out the larger cruisers and replace 
them with smaller vessels. Britain's adamant desire to have 
all future cruisers built smaller with smaller guns became 
the crucial point in the debate and contributed to the col-
lapse of the conference. 
Once the initial positions concerning cruisers were 
outlined, the delegates spent the rest of the conference 
struggling with various formulas in an attempt to break the 
deadlock. The first try occurred on I July. Admiral 
Schofield of the United States met with Captain Toyoda and 
Captain Egerton to discuss their differences. Egerton ad-
mitted that the British total of 600,000 tons was high, but 
stressed that this figure would increase to 750,000 tons if 
the Americans insisted that only large cruisers be built in 
the future. Of course, Egerton added, these cruisers would 
14Conference Records, p. 123. 
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be just for defensive purposes serving as protection for the 
British lines of communication. In response to Schofield's 
total consternation at such high tonnage figures, Egerton 
calmly replied that the Americans were "welcome to criticize 
until they were blue in the face so far as Great Britain 
was concerned." Schofield then introduced a proposal cal-
ling for an agreement that would last only until 1936 the 
expiration date of the treaty.lS 
After Egerton outlined Schofield's suggestion, the 
British formulated their reply. They would accept Scho-
field's proposals if in return the Americans would "in 
advance wholeheartedly agree" to the following four 
principles: (1) the age limit to be as high as possible; 
(2) the armament for the new type of cruiser to be of six-
inch calibre; (3) 7,SOO tons to be the maximum displacement 
of the new cruiser; and (4) the number of 10,000-ton, eight-
inch gun cruisers to be fixed by agreement. Subject to 
American acquiescence the British estimated their total ton-
nage by 1936 to be 462,000 tons. 16 
The British reply angered Admiral Jones and Gibson. 
Both men deprecated the attempt to force the Americans into 
15FRUS , 1927, pp. 66-67. 
l6Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the B.E.D., 1 July 
1927, ADM 116/2609. 
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making "blind promises" in exchange for the British decision 
to consider "a reasonable suggestion." Gibson recorded that 
the Japanese, also shocked by the British tonnage figure, 
had urged him to convince Bridgeman to lower their tonnage 
demands. Gibson informed Kellogg that if the British con-
tinued to insist on such high tonnage figures, he would ask 
them to publish these figures along with their rationale. 17 
The Americans had overlooked the fact that, although still 
higher than they desired, the British had lowered their 
tonnage demands from 600,000 to 460,000 tons. Unfortunately, 
the British manner in presenting these proposals had made 
American acceptance nearly impossible. 
The conference adjourned over the 4 July holiday and 
resumed on 5 July with another meeting of the Technical Com-
mittee. Admiral Field began the discussion by stating that 
the only way the American wish for a total tonnage of 300,000 
tons could be attained was through the limitation of large 
cruisers. After setting a reasonable limit on them the com-
mittee could then establish a proportion of smaller cruisers 
to each country. Field emphasized that a lower tonnage would 
have to be set for the smaller cruiser to enable the British 
17Ibid ., pp. 68-69. Kellogg cabled Gibson on 5 July ex-
pressing agreement with Gibson's opinion that the British 
cruiser demands were "so excessive as to be bey.ond considera-
tion by this Government." FRUS, 1927, p. 70. Kellogg told 
the press on 5 July that "two hundred and fifty or three 
hundred thousand tons for cruisers were adequate for my 
country," Kellogg Press Conferences. 
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to keep their small cruiser requirements and still work with-
in the American tonnage limits. Admiral Jones agreed that 
an arrangement would have to be reached to compromise the 
two positions and presented the American answer: (I) the 
United Stabes could not discuss cruiser tonnage in excess 
of 400,000 tons for the period ending 1 December 1936; (2) 
during this period the United States reserved the right to 
build 10,000-ton cruisers up to a total of 250,000 tons; 
(3) in an effort to meet the British desire for smaller ves-
sels the United States would agree to build within the 
400,000 tons a limit of smaller cruisers agreed upon by the 
conference; and (4) the United States saw no reason to arm 
smaller cruisers with guns inferior to those on large 
. 18 
crU1sers. 
The British were astounded with Jones' statement con-
cerning the American right to build up to twenty-five large 
cruisers. Bridgeman refused to take this demand seriously 
and visited Gibson to ascertain what the Americans really 
wanted. Gibson, surprised by the British reaction, assured 
Bridgeman that the proposals were just for "some basis of 
discussion. ,,19 But Bridgeman remained upset. Although 
l8Conference Records, pp. 160-61. Emphasis not in the 
original. 
19Bridgeman D{ary, p. 145. 
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Gibson discounted the significance of Jones' statement, the 
British interpreted it to mean an American ultimatum to 
build at least twenty-five large cruisers. This "ultimatum" 
also caused a stir in London. 
Admiral Beatty flatly rejected the Amer.ican claim for 
400,000 tons in cruisers. He argued that Great Britain would 
need more than 150,000 tons for small cruisers alone to guard 
the Empire, and the American demand for twenty-five large 
cruisers was ridiculous. 20 The Cabinet agreed and instruc-
ted Bridgeman to "take no final decision [on the cruiser 
question] but ask if necessary for an adjustment of dis-
cuss ion in order than you [Bridgeman] may consult your gov-
ernment.,,2l Bridgeman quickly replied that he would "in no 
circumstances have taken any formal decision involving 
e~ther [a] rupture of negotiations or a departure from [the] 
existing instructions until the government had reviewed 
[the] situation." Bridgeman was still hopeful that the 
latest proposals would result in a compromise and did not 
consider the situation so critical that adjournment was 
necessary.22 
20Cab 23/55, 6 July 1927. Beatty explained his views 
further at the 7 July 1927 meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, Cab 24/l87:C.P. 193. 
2lBritish Documents, p. 639; Cab 23/55, 6 July 1927. 
22British Documents, p. 647. 
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In their excitement over the large cruiser issue the 
British overlooked two important concessions by the Ameri-
cans: they had increased their total cruiser tonnage from 
300,000 to 400,000 tons and they had acknowledged the 
British suggestion for a division of the cruiser class into 
small and large vessels. These two points represented the 
first American attempts at compromise. Unfortunately, the 
conference would concentrate on the composition of all 
cruisers, and these important concessions would be lost in 
the controversy. 
During a meeting of the chief delegates on 6 July, the 
Japanese presented their first compromise plan. In summary, 
Tokyo recommended for Britain and the United states a limit 
of 450,000 tons for destroyers and cruisers combined, and 
for Japan, in keeping with the Washington Treaty ratio, 
300,000 tons. 23 The British immediately asked how the limit 
of 450,000 tons for all surface auxiliary vessels would 
accommodate the American demand for 400,000 tons in cruisers 
alone. The Japanese agreed that Washington must reduce the 
number of large cruisers to ten or twelve. The Americans 
voiced no initial objection to this suggestion, probably 
because of Gibson's wish to placate the British. 
23Conference Records, p. 165; FRUS, 1927, p. 76; Cab 
24/l87:C.P. 193. 
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After the meeting, Gibson cabled his impressions to 
Kellogg_ Although the British appeared unlikely to accept 
the Japanese proposal, Gibson wanted to give it vocal support. 
He hoped thereby to make the British aware that "they stand 
alone in their demands for a large cruiser tonnage," which 
would in turn force them to become more reasonable in their 
tonnage demands. 24 
The next day Gibson conceded for the first time that the 
conference might fail. If this happened, he suggested that 
the conference be ended as congenially as possible with a 
public statement from each delegation detailing its position 
and explaining the failure. 25 Kellogg agreed, but added that 
before a final breakdown became inevitable it might be wise 
to adjourn the conference for a week in order to review 
p'rogress. 26 Kellogg wanted to avoid the embarrassment of 
failure and its attendant repercussions. 
Coolidge had been kept abreast of the Geneva proceedings, 
and upon learning of the American plan for handling failure, 
wrote Kellogg that "what is needed is not excuse or soft 
words but [a] clear strong statement of [the] American 
position. Let blame fall where it may. Your plan [is] 
24 FRUS, 1927, p. 78. 
25Ibid ., pp. 80-82. 
26 Ibid . 
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approved. ,,27 Publicly Coolidge said little about the con-
ference, but privately he showed little patience with the 
negotiations and refused to consider compromise. 
On 9 July the Executive Committee focused on the Ameri-
can refusal to consider anything but total tonnage for 
cruisers. The British rejected the American plan because 
they wanted a limit on the numbers of individuals vessels in 
each category_ The Admiralty wished to know how many ships 
the Americans were going to build within their tonnage 
quota, and the Americans refused to give any definite figures 
until a total tonnage was determined for the whole class. The 
atmosphere became quite heated, and Cecil, at one point ex-
claimed that Admiral Jones was talking "nonsense." Gibson 
angrily threatened to walk out of the meeting and Cecil 
apologized. 28 
The Japanese then introduced still another plan. They 
proposed a 10:10:7 large cruiser ratio for Great Britain, the 
United States, and Japan respectively. The British im-
mediately seconded this proposal, and after initial 
27 Ibid., P _ 89. 
28For three different accounts of this incident see 
Wilson Diary, 9 July 1927, p. 1; Perrin C. Galpin, ed., 
Hugh Gibson 1883-1954: Extracts_from His Letters and Anec-
dotes from His Friends (New York: Belgian-American Educa-
tional Foundation, Inc., 1956), pp. 62-63; Hugh Wilson, 
Diplomat Between Wars (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1941), p. 218. 
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reluctance Admiral Jones agreed to consider it. But Jones 
still demanded that the British produce figures showing their 
projected total cruiser tonnage. Bridgeman responded with 
the suggestion that a solution might be found in a building 
program planned by the three powers which would last only 
until 1931. 29 Bridgeman added that the British were willing 
to abandon construction of lO,OOO-ton cruisers, except for 
those now under construction, and allow the United States 
to build an equal number of these vessels. The Japanese 
voiced their approval of this plan and indicated that they 
would stop construction of large cruisers if the United 
States adhered to this plan. 30 
Bridgeman's proposal was an important contribution to 
the negotiations. Instead of extending the proposed Geneva 
Treaty through 1936 as the Americans suggested, the British 
were now asking that the present agreements terminate in 
1931. They would thus coincide with the Washington Treaty 
provisions stipulating a review of battleship limitation 
in 1931. The agreements reached at Geneva could then be 
conveniently reviewed along with battleship and aircraft 
limitation. Bridgeman believed this would facilitate future 
negotiations on naval armaments. 
29Conference Records, pp. 93-102. 
30Ibid., p. 108. 
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Bridgeman's proposal coupled with those of the Japanese 
gave new life to the conference. Prior to these new pro-
posals the delegates had set 11 July for the next Plenary 
session. On 10 July the British delegation elected to post-
pone the public session for a ~ew days to see if an agreement 
could be reached on cruisers. 31 Bridgeman relayed this deci-
sion to Gibson, who offered no guarantee that an agreement 
would be found but agreed to postone the session if Bridge-
man initiated the move. Bridgeman did not want to take the 
responsibility for delaying the Plenary session and hoped 
Gibson would be gracious enough to recognize Britain's 
willingness to continue negotiations. 32 Gibson remained 
convinced, however, that the decision to postpone the 
Plenary session was Bridgeman's. 
The assassination in Dublin of Kevin O'Higgins, one of 
the British delegates, on 11 July broke the impasse. Bridge-
man, who had become angered by Gibson's refusal to postpone 
the Plenary session, bitterly recorded in his diary that 
upon hearing the tragic news, Gibson had ndaddled his ass 
and sent me a message to say the thought the conference had 
better be postponed out of respect for the memory of our 
3lMinutes of the Seventh Meeting of the B.E.D., 10 July 
1927, ADM 116/2609. 
32Bridgeman Diary, p. 153. 
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colleague. ,,33 Thus the parties agreed to postpone the pub-
lic meeting and continue private deliberations. 
After rescheduling the Plenary session for 14 July, 
the delegates tried a new tactic in their search for a solu-
tion. Viscount Ishii suggested that the senior delegates 
absent themselves from the negotiations and give the junior 
delegates an opportunity to break the cruiser deadlock. 
The junior participants, composed of one civilian and one 
naval officer from each delegation, met on 11 and 12 July. 
After working most of the night the committee translated the 
5-5-3 ratio into a combined surface auxiliary vessel ton-
nage of 525,000 for the United States and Great Britain, and 
315,000 tons for Japan. The British senior delegates labored 
with these figures and produced the following formula: (1) 
the British Empire agreed not to exceed 550,000 tons for 
auxiliary surface combatant craft under the following ages: 
cruisers, sixteen years; and destroyers, twelve years; (2) 
the right to retain, in addition, twenty percent of this 
total in vessels above the age limit; (3) the limitation of 
10,OOO-ton cruisers to a ratio of 12-12-8; (4) the eventual 
elimination of all cruisers above 6,000 tons for all three 
countries by 1945; and (5) no future auxiliary combatant 
33Ibid., p. 155. 
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vessels to be more than 6,000 tons and no gun mounted that 
d d ' . h ' l'b 34 excee e s~x-~nc es ~n ca ~ re . 
. The British had laid their cards on the table. All 
future cruisers were to be of smaller tonnage and gun calibre. 
Gibson immediately declared that the united States would 
never accept smaller guns. The Japanese were shocked by 
the increase in British tonnage from 525,000 to 550,000 tons 
and flatly rejected the proposals. Although Gibson snorted 
that the British plan was "really nothing more than a dis-
guised attempt to increase total tonnage," he was privately 
pleased that the British had reduced their tonnage demands 
from 600,000 to 550,000 tons. 35 A careful review of the 
original American proposals shows that they had presented a 
combined cruiser and destroyer tonnage of 450,000 to 550,000 
tons. The British statement coincided with the upper limit 
of the American proposals. It is highly likely that the 
Americans could have accepted the British total tonnage 
figure, but the added attempt to limit individual cruiser 
tonnage and gun calibre thwarted any chance for agreement on 
total tonnage. 
The cruiser issue had now been reduced to differences 
34 1 FRUS, 1927, p. 00. 
35Ibid ., p. 101. 
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over the size and tonnage of small cruisers. Although the 
United States had indicated its willingness to accept a 
division of cruisers into two classes, it drew the line at 
gun calibre. The United States saw no reason to reduce the 
armament of smaller cruisers and staunchly supported re-
tention of the eight-inch gun. The British hoped to phase 
out the large cruisers and replace them with a smaller, 
lighter-armed vessel. 
Although the conference had been in session for over 
three weeks, little had been accomplished after the first 
two. Several proposals had been presented to resolve the 
cruiser impasse, but none had been initially successful. 
The British now hoped that the second Plenary session would 
help them present a clearer picture of their position, and 
thus break the deadlock. If the impasse were not broken 
soon, the Geneva Conference would collapse. 
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THE CONFERENCE COLLAPSES 
Soon after the first Plenary session the British had 
begun asking for another. Although this request had been 
initially vetoed by the other two delegations who prepared 
to negotiate in private, the British had remained insistent. 
By the beginning of July the Americans and Japanese had 
decided to grant the British their wish and the second 
Plenary session was called. After some temporary adjustments 
and the death of O'Higgins, the date was set for 14 July. 
Bridgeman's basic purpose in having another public 
session was his wish to present the British position in a 
manner that could not be misrepresented by the IIhostile" 
press of the united States. Believing that the "atmosphere 
was being vitiated by gross misrepresentations of the British 
case in certain quarters" Bridgeman now had his chance to 
circumvent such problems. Bridgeman's reference to "certain 
quarters" evidently referred to Wythe Williams of the 
New York Times. Williams had tended to take an aggressive 
attitude toward the British proposals to such an extent that 
even Ambassador Howard had complained about the tone of 
1 William's reports from Geneva. Although Kellogg had not 
lsee for example Howard to Chamberlain, 23 June 1927, 
F.O. 800/261. In this letter Howard sighed, "There are times 
when I feel depressed and irritated almost beyond bearing by 
the tone and attitude of the Press here." On the same day 
Howard sent Chamberlain a telegram referring to Williams' 
report as "alarmist, suspicious, and unfriendly." ADM 
116/2609. 
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taken Howard's complaints seriously, he had nevertheless 
forwarded them to Gibson. 2 Even Howard did not consistently 
deprecate the reports. He remarked to Chamberlain at one 
point that the American public would probably forget the 
stories in twenty-four hours if an agreement were reached. 3 
Gibson surmised that the British were upset only because the 
stories were more accurate than they cared to admit. "The 
British have not handled the press well throughout [the] 
conference, and seen unable to understand that [the] American 
journalists are fundamentally self-respecting and patriotic. ,,4 
Although correspondents such as Williams attacked the 
British proposals from the beginning of the conference,S the 
9 
press in both countries acctirqte1y ·reported the -proceedings-· 
One may conclude that the British were made uncomfortable by 
2 FRUS, 1927, p. 93. 
3British Documents, p. 672. 
4FRUS , 1927, p. 106. For more on this aspect of the 
conference see John Carter, "American Correspondents and the 
British Delegates: Some Reasons for the Failure at Geneva," 
The Independent 119 (13 August 1927) :150-52; Silas Brent, 
"International Window Smashing: The Role of Our Newspapers 
in Foreign Affairs, II Harper's MonthEY 157 (September 1928) : 423. 
SHe charged, for example, on 21 June 1927, that the 
British proposals would force the United States to "complete-
ly surrender" their naval equality on paper. The next day 
he accused Bridgeman of asking for "unquestionable supremacy". 
New York Times, 21 and 22 June 1927, p. 1. 
6Although reporting with the bias of their respectives 
viewpoints, newspapers such as London Times and the New York 
Tribune accurately reported the facts of the conference 
throughout its existence. 
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the chauvanism of the American press, and sought to counter 
it with charges that their position was being misrepresented. 
,No evidence was found to support their accusations. 
The British had another complaint which was probably 
more valid. They believed that representatives of large 
American ship-building concerns were in Geneva stirring up 
bad feeling against the British. In this instance they were 
probably referring to William Shearer. 7 Prior to the con-
ference the "Big Three" shipbuilding companies had hired 
Shearer to lobby in their behalf. Promised a fee of $25,000, 
Shearer moved to Geneva and began distributing pamphlets 
with an anti-British bias. Shearer soon became a convenient 
source of information for correspondents scrambling for the 
few bits of information coming out of the closed meetings. 
Wi'11iams was among those who turned to Shearer. 8 Shearer's 
7For more on this subject see, Joseph H. Kitchens, Jr., 
"The Shearer Scandal and Its Origins: Big Navy Politics and 
Diplomacy in the 1920's" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Georgia, 1968); U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings: Alleged Activities of 
William B. Shearer in Behalf of Certain Shipbuilding 
Companies at the Geneva Conference and at the Meetings of 
the Preparatory Commission, Pursuant to S. Res. 114, 7lst 
Congress, 1st Session, 1930. 
8Kitchens, IIShearer Scandal," pp. 133,135,141. The 
"Big Three" shipbuilding companies consisted of t~e B7th~e­
hem Shipbuilding Corporation, the Newport News Sh7pbulldl~g 
and Drydock Company, and the American Brown Boverl Electrlc 
Corporation. For an example of later opinion on the scandal 
see, "Shearer, The Newspapers, and a Betrayed Public," 
Christian Century 46 (30 October 1929) :1335-37. 
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greatest impact on the conference was his discovery that the 
British had built larger battleships than allowed by the 
Washington Treaty.9 An embarrassed State Department re-
ceived a formal protest from Ambassador Howard who charged 
th t th h d b 1 k f h Am · d 1 . 10 a ere a een ea s rom t e er~can e egat1on. 
Of course there had been no "leak" from the American dele-
gation, only Shearer, doing his job. But the work of 
Shearer behind the scenes and the press stories of Wythe 
Williams convinced the British that another public session 
was necessary. 
Gibson, as chairman, opened the second Plenary session 
and briefly described the progress of the conference. He 
concluded that it was "the right and duty of any of the 
delegates to ask for a Plenary meeting" when they believed 
it would contribute toward an agreement. 
Bridgeman then made his statement. ll He explained that 
the British had come to the conference with a program designed 
to reduce expenditures in all classes of vessels. In the 
area of cruisers the British were willing to adopt the 
9Shearer caused a minor uproar with his statement that 
the British had a ratio of 6:5 in battleships instead of the 
treaty ratio of 5:5. This discrepancy had been solved at 
the First Technical Committee meeting, when the naval ex-
perts agreed to use as the basis of their discussion the 
"Washington Standard Tonnage." 
10 FRUS, 1927, p. 93. 
llconference Records, pp. 36-37. 
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Washington ratio with large cruisers and refrain from 
building these vessels until that level was reached by the 
United States. In small cruisers the British desired to 
limit their size and gun calibre so that they would be 
defensive and not offensive weapons. The British Admiralty 
had determined that an 8-inch gun would have a fire power of 
two and one-half times that of the 6-inch gun, thus giving 
the larger gun a substantial advantage over the smaller one. 
Bridgeman stre~sed that limitation by total tonnage was a 
good idea in principle, but it should be known beforehand "I 
what the size of the individual vessels would be within this 
tonnage to make the idea practical. 
Bridgeman repeated the British intention not to dispute 
the claim of the United States to build and possess an 
equal number of small cruisers. Their concern was that they 
would not be allowed the necessary number of these small 
vessels. "It is our own security with which we are con-
cerned and our power in the future to protect our sea 
communication against hostile raids •. .. 12 
Viscount Ishii, the next speaker, repeated the Japanese 
proposal. This consisted of a limit of 450,000 tons for 
Great Britain and the united States and 300,000 tons for 
12Conference Records, pp. 39-40. Bridgeman's speech can 
also be found in Command Paper 2964, pp. 7-12. 
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Japan in surface auxiliary vessels. Great Britain and the 
United States would be limited to ten 10,000-ton cruisers, and 
Japan to seven. The Japanese thus hoped to limit effective-
ly the total tonnage, while still giving each country the 
freedom to build what it wanted within the total tonnage 
allocated. 13 
Hugh Gibson then reiterated the American intention to 
place a total tonnage limit on surface auxiliary vessels 
ranging from 450,000 to 550,000 tons. This, Gibson argued, 
was "the fairest method of limitation," leaving each country 
"free to build the types and numbers of vessels" necessary for 
its welfare. 14 
In conclusion, Gibson stated that the United States be-
lieved they were near agreement with the Japanese on total 
tonnage and the types of cruisers within these tonnage totals. 
Although he admitted the inherent difficulties with a tri-
partite treaty, he remained confident that an agreement could 
still be reached if Great Britain and Japan could reconcile 
their differences. 15 
13Conference Records, pp. 45-48. 
l4 Ibid ., p. 50. 
15some evidently believed the conference had ended. See 
e.g., George Glascow, "Naval Disarmanent," The Contemporary 
Review 132 (August'1927) :437; Will Rogers also seemed to 
believe the conference had ended, remarking that "the confer-
ence is over but at least the United States didn't lose," 
New York Times, 16 July 1927, p. 13. 
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The second Plenary session produced no surprises. No 
new positions were advanced. An Anglo-American compromise 
seemed no nearer. The conference was still alive, however, 
and the delegates resumed their negotiations. 
Although the Geneva delegates remained hopeful, officials 
in London were not happy with the progress. 16 The Cabinet 
decided on 14 July to recall their delegates for consulta-
tion, believing it "essential that we should have an oppor-
tunity of consulting verbally with you before definite 
decisions are taken at Geneva." 17 Bridgeman asked the 
Cabinet to reconsider its decision. The First Lord argued 
that a departure at that time would "seriously impair the 
prospect of agreement" and respectfully asked the Cabinet 
where the difficulty 1ay.18 
The Cabinet acquiesced and instead of recalling them, 
sent the British delegates a full statement of its position 
on cruisers. While conceding parity in large cruisers, the 
l6Ke11og9 had been informed of such rumors at a press 
conference on 14 July 1927, Kellogg Press Conferences. 
l7British Documents, p. 679. The decision to recall the 
delegates had been suggested at a meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defense on 14 July 1927. After extended debate, 
Chamberlain and Baldwin, at the urging of Churchill and 
others, decided to instruct Bridgeman and Cecil to ask for 
an adjournment of the conference. Cab 2/5, 14 July 1927. 
18British Documents, pp. 679-80. 
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Cabinet steadfastly refused to accept limits on small cruisers. 
Although quite happy to support an agreement limiting the large 
cruisers to a ratio among the three nations, the Admiralty 
would not condone any formula fixing Ita permanent total ton-
nage limit for all classes of ships whether specified in 
classes or lumped together." The Cabinet, however, did 
endorse Bridgeman's proposal to have the Geneva agreements 
last only until 1931. The Admiralty reasoned that the 
shorter the period for the treaty, the less chance the 
United States would have to build cruisers up to the British 
level. 19 They were content to maintain their numerical ad-
vantage in cruisers as long as possible. 
In Geneva the British and Japanese naval personnel met 
in an effort to resolve their differences. On 15 July they 
produced a document which recommended: (1) total surface 
vessel tonnage for Great Britain, 500,000 tons, for Japan 
325,000 tons; (2) the retention of twenty-five percent of 
the total tonnage in over-age vessels; (3) 10,OOO-ton 
cruisers limited in number with Great Britain and the 
United States each allowed twelve, Japan eight; (4) the re-
tention of certain cruisers below 10,000 tons for each 
country; (5) six-inch guns placed on all future vessels; (6) 
an agreed maximum percentage of total tonnage divided 
19Ibid., 'pp. 683-84. 
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between cru±sers and destroyers; and (7) the reduction of 
Japanese submarine tonnage from 70,000 to 60,000 tons. 20 
When these recommendations were presented to the chief 
delegates on 18 July, Gibson immediately raised questions 
about the proposal to limit all future vessels to six-inch 
guns. Although the Japanese had anticipated an American ob-
jection, they had included it to placate the British. 2l 
The Japanese had also taken 10,000 tons from the submarine 
class and added it to the cruiser and destroyer class in an 
effort to maintain the Washington ratio. Despite these 
Anglo-Japanese efforts, the Americans maintained their 
reservations over the six-inch gun. 22 
The next day the delegates resumed their discussion. 
Gibson concentrated on the gun-size issue arguing that the 
United States would not depart from its insistence on the 
large gun. Bridgeman stated they had reduced their tonnage 
figures to accommodate a smaller gun calibre and promised 
that if there was an increase in gun calibre, they would 
correspondingly increase their tonnage demands. Gibson, 
20Ibid ., pp. 690-91; Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of 
the B.E.D., 19 July 1927, ADM 116/2609. 
2lBritish Documents, p. 687. The Japanese were con-
cerned about the difficulties of men of their small stature 
manually loading 8-inch guns.-
22 Conference Records, pp. 170-72. 
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becoming exasperated, speculated that British apprehensions 
might be based on a fear that the United States would use its 
eight-inch guns against the British Empire. If so, he pro-
posed that a political clause be included in the anticipated 
treaty which would "permit a re-examination of the cruiser 
provisions in the event that the construction of 8-inch gun 
vessels was a cause of apprehension to any of the contracting 
powers. " This "political clause," was Gibson's last offer. 23 
Before the Geneva delegates could debate the latest 
development, the British were abruptly summoned to London. 24 
Cecil, Bridgeman, and Field left for home on 20 July. Cecil's 
communication to the Cabinet on 18 July precipitated its sud-
den behavior. The Viscount had indicated that he and Bridge-
man were puzzled over the latest cable from the Cabinet. The 
f 
Admiralty had asserted that it would refuse to accept any 
treaty on small cruisers which assigned to Great Britain "a 
position of permanent naval inferiority." Cecil was confused 
and a little upset that the Cabinet had now intimated that 
parity with the United States in small cruisers was un-
acceptable. He reminded the government that at the end of 
June Bridgeman had committed himself to parity. If denied 
now, only three weeks later, the British would be "rightly 
23conference Records, pp. 172-74. 
24British Documents, p. 698. 
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accused of vacillation amounting almost to sharp practice. It 
Cecil maintained that the delegates had understood parity to 
mean ship for ship mathematical equality. Regardless of 
how this was figured, it still meant parity. He failed to 
understand how the Admiralty could worry about any "perma-
nent" naval inferiority when the treaty being considered was 
to last, at the most, only a decade. Nor could he believe 
the United States would launch into a huge building program. 
Regardless of the Admiralty's opinions, Cecil insisted that 
at the present stage of the conference it was impossible to 
tell the Americans that the British would accept parity in 
large cruisers but not in small ones. Cecil declared that 
he could "conceive [of] no more disastrous termination of 
the present conference" than now to deny parity to the 
Americans in small cruisers. 25 
The Admiralty was indeed denying the Americans parity 
in small cruises in the belief that mathematical parity was in 
reality superiority for the United States, since they could 
use the extra vessels to harrass the Empire, Cecil's letter 
disturbed the Admiralty, resulting in the government's 
becoming, as Bridgeman phrased it, "pissy", and hastily 
25Cecil to Chamberlain, 17 July 1927, Cecil Papers, ADD. 
MSS. 51079. Reprinted in British Documents, pp. 693-95. 
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recalling the British delegates. 26 
Cecil and Bridgeman met with a committee of the Cabinet 
on 21 July.27 Beatty objected to two particular points of 
the Anglo-Japanese scheme: (1) the apparent right by treaty 
to parity in all ships; and (2) the 5:3.25 ratio. The com-
mittee produced two alternatives for the full Cabinet to 
consider the next day. The first basically repeated the 
British position as it had been articulated throughout the 
conference. If the United States should reject it, "the 
conference would be allowed to break down." The second also 
reiterated the British position, but suggested that Great 
Britin would build a certain number of small cruisers through 
1936 which could be equalled by the United States. Signifi-
cantly, the proposition included the provision that parity 
was not applicable here. The British reserved the freedom 
to build as they wished after the treaty expired in 1936. 
If the United States and Japan agreed to this stipulation, 
Whitehall would give serious consideration to the Anglo-
26Bridgeman Diary, p. 155. Bridgeman added that "Balfour, 
who had invented the word 'parity' at Washington thought we 
had been too final in accepting this [idea?] and ought to have 
explained that parity did not really mean what it seemed to 
mean. " Ibid. 
27Baldwin's biographers incorrectly give 21 July as the 
date for this meeting. They evidently confuse this meeting 
with the session of ,the full Cabinet, held the next day, 22 
July; Baldwin did not attend the 21 July committee. Keith 
Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 370. 
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Japanese plan. 28 
Great Britain's insistence that small cruisers were 
excluded from parity was crucial. The British were saying 
that for a specified period of ti~e. up to 1936 they would 
build the number of cruisers they desired and had no objection 
to the number of vessels the other two countries constructed. 
But the British were not contractually agreeing to any 10ng-
term parity, particularly in small cruisers. With the 
expiration of the treaty, they would be free to build what-
ever size vessels they desired. Great Britain would thus 
avoid "permanent inferiority," the great fear of Beatty and 
others. 
At the Cabinet meeting the next day the Admiraltyunan-
imously supported the second alternative. A majority of 
the Cabinet rejected the first plan as certain to kill the 
conference. 29 Attempts to shorten the period to 1931 failed, 
the Cabinet deciding that any technical aspects would be left 
for the determination of the Admiralty. It then directed 
the Geneva delegates to present the modified plan to the other 
powers in Geneva with the added stipulation that Great Britain 
28Cab 24/188: C.P. 211. 
29Although the Cabinet Minutes are vague, another source 
lists Churchill as ,one of the dissenters. Middlemas and 
Barnes, Baldwin, p. 370. 
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not be found past the expiration date of the treaty.30 
With the situation seemingly in hand, Prime Minister 
Baldwin left for an official visit to Canada on 23 July 
leaving Chamberlain in command. 3l After Baldwin's de-
parture a minority in the Cabi~et won some concessions: 
Lord Balfour was instructed to read to Parliament a state-
ment on 26 July. It explained why Great Britain wanted no 
limitation on small cruisers. The basic point of Balfour'S 
document was the thesis that the "British Empire cannot be 
asked to give any • • . appearance of an immutable principle; 
for this is liable to be interpreted in the future as a for-
mal surrender of the doctrine of maritime equality. ,,32 
In other words, Great Britain would not allow the United 
States parity in small cruisers because this would eventual-
ly place Great Britain in an inferior position. The British 
were willing to agree to equality for a short period, as 
stated in the second alternative, but refused to accept any 
such principie over the long-term. 
30Cab 23/55, 22 July 1927. 
3lBaldwin's biographers incorrectly placed Baldwin's 
departure on 21 July. 
32cab 24/188: C.P. 212. For accounts in the Houses of 
Parliament, see Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 5th series, 209 (1927) :1246-49; Great 
Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th 
series, 68 (1927):933-36. 
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Balfour's statement disturbed Cecil. He was particu-
larly upset with its wording which "from its very point and 
vigor is bound to lead to a recrudescence of all the bit-
terest controversy." He warned that only in amended form 
could such a statement be accepted by the Americans as some-
thing other than obnoxious, adding that it might be a good 
idea if Balfour replaced him at Geneva. If the Cabinet in-
sisted on adopting measures of which he disapproved, Cecil 
informed Chamberlain: "I could always consider my position.,,33 
Despite Cecil's objections the Cabinet committee rec-
ommended that Balfour's statement be read to Parliament on 
26 July. As to whether the treaty should expire in 1931 or 
1936, the Admiralty chose the later date. If, however, the 
Cabinet decided to choose 1931, the Admiralty then insisted 
that Great Britain be allowed to drop its demand for arming 
cruisers with six-inch guns. If Great Britain armed its new 
vessels with the smaller gun until 1931, it ran the risk of 
having these vessels outclassed after 1931 by new vessels 
with large guns. The Admiralty worried that after 1931 the 
other two powers would refuse to limit their new guns to six 
inches, and Great Britain would be left with cruisers 
equipped with guns inferior to those on post-treaty 
33Cecil to Chamberlain, 24 July 1927, F.D. 800/261. 
Cecil evidently meant he would resign if the conference 
failed. Bridgeman referred to Balfour's statement as a 
"casuistical essay." Bridgeman Diary, p. 157. 
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cruisers. 34 
On 26 July the Cabinet met in full session to debate 
whether to adopt 1931 or 1936 as the expiration date. The 
discussion "fined down" the issue to two basic choices: (1) 
accept 1931 and insist on the right to arm all small cruisers 
with eight-inch guns; or (2) accept 1936 with the stipulation 
that all small cruisers be armed with a maximum calibre of 
six inches. The first option, avidly supported by Cecil as 
having the better chance of acceptance by the United States, 
was rejected by the Admiralty because it "would involve an 
increase of expenditure over our present program ••.• ,,35 
Unfortunately, the second option would probably be rejected 
by the United States, resulting in the failure of the 
conference. 
Despite Cecil's and Bridgeman's vehement support for 
1931, the Cabinet remained steadfast in its desire to limit 
future armament to six-inch guns and adopted 1936 as the 
expiration date of the treaty.36 They ignored Cecil's request 
34Cab 24/188: C.P. 212. 
35Beatty argued that each 8-inch gun cruiser would cost 
250,000 pounds more than those equipped with the smaller gun. 
36Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
(Lords), 5th series, 69 (1927) :92. 
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to be replaced,37 and sent the delegates back to Geneva 
with the modified plan. 38 Recognizing the possibility of 
an American rejection, the Cabinet stipulated that the 
British delegates "should insist on an opportunity to make 
a public statement ... of the British proposals. ,,39 
The British hoped to explain the reasons for their decision 
to retain the six-inch gun. The Cabinet had drawn the line 
from which there would be no retreat. 
The American officials also solidified their position. 
During the hiatus Kellogg informed Gibson to stand firm on 
37Cab 23/55, 26 July 1927. By the end of the session 
three other ministers had threatened resignation: Churchill, 
Birkenhead, and Bridgeman. Chamberlain to his sister, Ida, 
7 August 1927, Chamberlain Papers, as quoted in David Carlton, 
"Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmanent Conference 
of 1927," Political Science Quarterly 82 (December 1968): 
590. Cecil later charged that Churchill had led the fight 
against any possible compromise on the large cruisers be-
cause "he thought such a proposal would not improbably produce 
an agreement with the Americans which he was determined if 
possible to avoid." Cecil to Baldwin, 9 August 1927, Cecil 
of Chelwood Papers, ADD. MSS. 51079. Reprinted in Robert 
Cecil, A Great Experiment (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1941), pp. 358-63. 
38These modified proposals are printed in Appendix II 
of Cab 23/55, also printed in Appendix I to item No. III in 
Command Paper 2964. 
39Cab 23/55, 26 July 1927. 
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the American right to have the eight-inch gun. The Navy had 
decided that the United States only needed seventy percent of 
its ,total tonnage in 10,OOO-ton cruisers. They wanted the 
freedom, however, to arm all vessels with eight-inch guns. 40 
Coolidge expressed approval of the Navy opinions: "We 
have made a perfectly straightforward and candid presentation 
of a plan for limitation. I do not think we should deviate 
from it.,,4l The Coolidge Administration and the Cabinet 
staunchly defended their respective positions. Neither wished 
to compromise. Unfortunately, only a compromise could save 
the conference. 
The British delegates returned to Geneva on 27 July and 
met the next day with the other two delegations. Bridgeman 
presented the modified British plan, which immediately drew 
an inquiry from Gibson who wondered if the delegates had in-
formed the Cabinet of American thinking vis-a-vis a 6,000-
ton, six-inch gun limit for small cruisers. Cecil nodded 
and said the Cabinet had instructed them not to deviate from 
their stated position. This position was final and Gibson 
had no choice but to communicate the substance of the new 
plan to his government. 
Gibson decided this was a good time to reintroduce the 
40FRUS , 1927,. pp. 130-31. 
41 I bid., pp. 133-34. 
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political clause. The British delegates intimated that al-
though the clause had some good points, they would probably 
still have to reject it because of its silence on the 
eight-inch gun. When asked their opinion of the political 
clause, the Japanese declared that they did not intend to 
build any more eight-inch gun cruisers prior to 1936, but 
still would not like being bound by any treaty. 
After brief discussion, the delegates agreed to publi-
cize the revised British plan. They then contemplated a 
third Plenary session. Gibson expressed no objection to 
holding another session, but requested that it be delayed 
until August so he could consult his government on the 
latest developments. This request appeared reasonable to 
the other delegates and the third session was set for 1 
August. 42 
Cecil and Bridgeman wired the Cabinet that the American 
attitude had "stiffened during their absence in London." Both 
offered a possible way out of the impasse. 43 Cecil remained 
convinced there was still hope for success if 1931 became 
the terminating date. This would allow the United States to 
42Conference Records, pp. 174-78. For British and 
American accounts, see British Documents, pp. 704-705: FRUS, 
1927, pp. 137-38. 
43British Documents, p. 705. Bridgeman also blamed the 
hardening of the American position on the Balfour statement, 
"this statement may well have been thought a recession from 
our former attitude." Bridgeman Diary, p. 157. 
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build eight-inch-gun cruisers without any objection from 
the British. 44 Bridgeman offered a plan compromising the 
gun calibre at seven inches. 45 
Gibson reacted negatively to the modified British plan. 
Hugh Wilson recorded that upon Gibson's arrival at his hotel 
room, he had announced with a solemn look: "Gentlemen, the 
old cow is dead." The British proposals were "more in-
acceptable than what they went away with [to Londonl." Gib-
son informed Cecil that there probably was not a "ghost of 
hope" for the conference. 46 The Americans thus began pre-
pareing their final public statement. 
secretary of State Kellogg and Secretary of the Navy, 
Curtis Wilbur, saw an adjournment of several months as the 
only way to save the conference. A hiatus was better than 
having the conference end amidst final speeches and hardened 
positions, thus making it more difficult to "effect any 
reconciliation between divergent points of view. n47 
44British Documents, p. 705. 
45 Ibid . The Cabinet hastily gathered on 29 July and 
voted firmly against any compromise on gun size, Cab 23/55. 
See British Documents, pp. 706-707 for Chamberlain's message 
to Bridgeman indicating the Cabinet decision. For a personal 
plea against the compromise, see William Joynson-Hicks (JIX) 
to Chamberlain, 29 July 1927, F.O. 800/261. 
46Wi1son Diary, 28 July 1927. 
47FRUS , 1927, pp. 138-39. Evidently the idea for an 
extended adjournment had been originally suggested by 
Assistant Secretary of State, William Castle. British 
Documents, p. 706. 
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Gibson thought this idea had possibilities. He proposed, 
however, that such a suggestion should come from either the 
United Kingdom or Japan. If the Americans intimated a 
desire for adjournment, the inference might be drawn that 
the United States lacked confidence in its position and had 
elected to avoid a confrontation with the British in a 
Plenary session. Gibson felt that if the Japanese proposed 
adjournment, the Americans and British could then accept. 48 
President Coolidge, when advised of the latest wrinkle, 
told Kellogg that "adjournment means continuing recrimina-
tions with little prospect of better results. Have [a] 
clear, firm statement of our position.,,49 The President 
had run out of patience with the conference. His dream of 
a successful international disarmament conference had now 
turned into a nightmare; his only wish was to have it end as 
soon as possible. 
The final scramble to save the conference now began. 
On 31 July the delegates agreed to postpone the third public 
session to give them more time, to negotiate. SO The next 
day the Japanese produced another compromise plan: (1) the 
48 FRUS, 1927, p. 140. 
49 Ibid ., p. 141. Coolidge's position was restated in a 
telegram to Castle on 2 August, declaring that there was "no 
foundation for the reports • • • that the Geneva Conference 
will suspend until Fall." Kellogg Papers, 2 August 1927. 
SOFRUS, 1927, p. 143. 
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Japanese and British would not build any further auxiliary 
vessels other than authorized prior to the conference; (2) 
after. completing their allotted lO,OOO-ton cruisers, the 
British would have no limit placed on small cruisers; (3) 
the United states would agree not to exceed the British 
total tonnage before 31 December 1931; and (4) questions not 
decided at the present conference would be dealt with at a 
51 
new conference held no later than 1931. The Japanese plan 
allowed Anglo-American parity in large cruisers, while giving 
the British freedom to build the small cruisers it required 
for national security. 
Although the Americans noticed there was no mention of 
gun limitation, Gibson elected to say nothing because the 
British would probably notice it quickly enough. The word 
"authorized" in the first part of the Japanese proposal 
bothered Gibson, and he asked the Japanese to define it. 
He hoped that "authorized" programs meant only those vessels 
under construction or for which money had already been ap-
propria ted. Gibson added that he would recommend that 
these programs be expressed in total tonnage figures not to 
be exceeded by 1931. Although the Americans viewed the 
Japanese proposals as having a slim chance for success, they 
51Ibid., p. 148. 
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would leave any flat rejection up to the British. 52 
On 3 August the delegates met to ascertain the British 
interpretation of "authorized" programs. If the British 
construed it to mean only the tonnage for which money had 
been appropriated, the Americans estimated the British 
cruiser program would fall somewhere around 400,000 tons, an 
acceptable figure. If, on the other hand, the British con-
strued it to mean all ships projected for the period of the 
treaty, the total tonnage would then be significantly above 
400,000 tons and would be rejected. The British replied to 
Gibson's direct inquiry that they interpreted the wording to 
mean that they would be allowed to build their full program 
through 1931, which translated to 458,000 tons. 53 Gibson 
then announced that this total was unacceptable, and the 
United States would have to reject the Japanese proposal. 
After asking if there were any other propositions and re-
ceiving a negative reply, Gibson asserted that the only re-
maining task was to make final preparations for the Plenary 
session scheduled for 4 August. 
Gibson stated his desire for a joint announcement, 
52 Ib:Ld., pp. '148-50. 
530n 30 July Beatty retired and was replaced by Charles 
Madden, brother-in-law to Jellicoe. Madden retained Beatty's 
position, stating that the British certainl¥ had the right to 
"complete our existing program of construct~on, as approved 
by the Cabinet. Cab 24/188: C.P. 219. 
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instead of three separate speeches, but the British in-
sisted on delivering a final speech. After a brief debate, 
Gibson finally acquiesced. The agenda for the next day was 
as follows: (1) an introductory statement by Gibson outlining 
the progress and problems of the conference; (2) final 
speeches by Bridgeman, Saito, and Gibson; and (3) a joint 
declaration recognizing the deadlock and a recommendation 
that the respective governments carefully study the facts of 
the conference with the idea of reconvening a new conference 
in the near future. 54 Gibson was able to fulfill his desire 
for a joint statement, while at the same time the British 
could present their final speech. 
The third, and final, Plenary session on 4 August gave 
each delegate a chance to repeat his position. Nothing new 
was presented. 55 The British remained unable to understand 
why the Americans had remained so steadfast in their re-
fusal to allow the British to build the cruisers it required. 
On the other hand, the Americans found it "incredible ••• 
that the British haven't seen fit to let us have our toys 
if we want them. "56 Regardless of their efforts to 
54Conference Records, pp. 179-181. 
55Ibid ., pp. 54-71. Bridgeman's speech is also printed 
in Command Paper 2964, pp. 12-21. 
56Wilson Diary, 4 August 1927. 
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stress their different positions, all three speeches were 
friendly in tone and maintained the fervent wish that a 
-
solution could be found to the vexing problem of auxiliary 
vessel limitation. 
Secretary of State Kellogg and President Coolidge both 
made brief statements after the conference ended. Kellogg 
admitted the failure of the conference, but stressed that the 
"failure to make and agreement now" was not final. He re-
mained confident that an agreement could be reached in the 
near future. 57 Coolidge also commented favorably on the 
outcome of the conference, emphasizing that relations among 
the three nations remained amiable. "I do not expect that 
the failure to reach an agreement at Geneva will have any 
serious effect upon the peace of the world • • • just because 
they were not able to agree ... doesn't interfere at all 
with the peaceful relations that exist between the three 
countries. ,,58 
The 1927 Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference was over. 
The first attempt to extend the provisions of the Washington 
Treaty to auxiliary vessels had failed. Although all con-
cerned stressed that an agreement could be found in the 
57FRUS , 1927, pp. 155-56. 
58Coolidge Press Conferences. 
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future, some basic problems would have to be solved first. 
Great Britain and the united States would have to reconcile 
their differences over cruiser tonnage and armament. If 
these two areas could be harmonized, it was then quite pos-
sible that an agreement on auxiliary vessels could be 
consumated. Unfortunately, relations between the Anglo-
Saxon powers became severely strained in the following year. 
Efforts to complete the work would have to await an improve-
ment in that relationship. 
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THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE FAILURE 
AT GENEVA 
Although it lasted only seven weeks, the Geneva Confer-
ence had been a grueling experience for the participants. 
The disappointment of failure plus the fatigue resulting from 
constant tension had taken its "toll with a vengeance" on 
Gibson. He wrote his mother after the conference that he 
wished he had been "like many of my dear colleagues who take 
things comfortably and don't take it to heart if things in 
general don't work out."l But the American was not alone in 
feeling the physical effects of the conference. William 
Bridgeman confided to Chamberlain that he was "very tired" 
and blamed part of his fatigue on the weather in Geneva. 
The climate had not been very "bracing" and the First Lord 
had kept going only "by eating and drinking as little as 
possible. ,,2 The two chief negotiators spent the weeks fol-
lowing the conference recuperating. 
While the participants recovered from the strain of 
negotiations, the government officials experienced the 
indignity of failure. Three days after the conference 
ended Vice-President Charles Dawes spoke at the dedication of 
the Peace Bridge over the Niagara River. Kellogg and Prime 
IGibson to his mother, 25 September 1927, Gibson Papers. 
2Bridgeman to Chamberlain, 7 August 1927, F.O. 800/261. 
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Minister Baldwin, also in attendance, heard Dawes bluntly say ) I. t' ., 
that "perhaps before this conference was held there was not 
the preliminary careful appraisement by each conferee of the 
necessities of the other •••• ,,3 Kellogg was appalled at 
such an "indiscreet" remark, though he evidently anticipated 
that Dawes would do "some foolish thing.,,4 Nonetheless, the 
indictment angered Kellogg, and he noted privately that 
the speech had been "distinctly in bad taste and a slap at 
his own Government but he is such an unmitigated ass that 
he is always doing something of the kind." 5 But Dawes had 
only repeated what he was reading in newspapers such as the 
New York Times, which had stated as early as 25 June that 
there had not been enough pre-conference preparation. The 
Times repeated this charge after the conference closed and 
listed it as the most likely reason for the failure. 6 
Kellogg vigorously denied the charge of inadequate 
preparation. He reassured President Coolidge that lithe most 
careful preparations were made •••• " Kellogg related that 
3New York Times, 8 August 1927, p. 14. 
4Kellogg to Coolidge, lQ August 1927, Kellogg Papers. 
5Kellogg to Phillips, 9 August 1927, Ibid. Dawes later 
defended his speech against charged that it had been un-
diplomatic, stating that, "Common sense is never undiplo-
matic." Charles G. Dawes, Notes as Vice-President, 1928-
1929 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), p. 104. 
6 New York Times, 25 June 1927, p. 16; Ibid., 5 August 
1927, p. 16. 
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Jones had written him after the conference charging that 
the British had gone back on everything they had agreed to 
during the talks in London. In Kellogg's opinion, the 
British had not "showed good faith at all in the conference." 
Although he had done everything in his power to effect some 
agreement, he "could not recommend an agreement that did not 
give us parity in fact as well as in principle. . . ." 7 While 
"irritated at the British attitude, .. 8 the Secretary had 
harbored "no illusions" about the success of the conference 
but felt it was worth trying and, if it failed, the American 
people should know the reasons. 9 Kellogg reflected the 
general attitude of the Navy which was determined throughout 
the conference to adhere to the preconceived American plan 
and not compromise on any of the fundamental issues. Even in 
failure, and during the days when criticism came frequently 
and stridently, the American officials remained confident 
that they had done the right thing in refusing to compromise. 
Austen Chamberlain bore similar criticism. Admitting 
that the conference had worried him more "than about anything 
7Kellogg to Coolidge, 10 August 1927, Kellogg Papers. 
Reprinted in FRUS, 1927, pp. 157-59. 
8Allen Dulles to Gibson, 9 September 1927, Hugh R. 
Wilson Papers; Kellogg to Frank Simonds, 17 August 1927, 
Kellogg Papers. The Wilson Papers are deposited in the 
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. 
9Kellogg to Simonds, 17 August 1927, Kellogg Papers. 
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which has occurred since I took my present office," Chamber-
lain, more willing than Kellogg to accept some of the blame 
for the failure, sighed: "No doubt a great mistake was made 
in entering upon such a conference without a preliminary 
exchange of ideas •... " The foreign minister argued, 
however, that the reason for the lack of such preparation 
lay in the British desire not to offenq the Americans by 
delaying a reply to the invitation. The British did not 
want to appear unsympathetic to naval disarmament and thus 
replied without asking questions about the substance of the 
negotiations. But Chamberlain also admitted a second reason 
for the inadequate preparation. The Admiralty had been 
reluctant "to disclose their plan in advance" to the Ameri-
cans, mainly because of its desire to have the advantage the 
Americans had enjoyed in 1921. Nevertheless, Chamberlain was 
still disappointed that the Americans refused to see the 
British viewpoint and stubbornly demanded parity in cruisers 
f f t o 10 or reasons 0 pres 1ge. 
William Bridgeman was more critical of the Americans. 
He bitterly charged that the Americans were "a terrible lot 
of people to deal with and Gibson is a mean and untruthful 
twister." The First Lord defended the pre-conference secrecy 
of the Admiralty, predicting that "if we had broached our 
10British Documents, pp. 729-30. 
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scheme earlier the American Press would have been just as 
bad or worse. • " Bridgeman had a low regard for the 
American press, which had been "damnable from the start" and 
had, he was convinced, gotten "orders from Gibson the first 
day to discredit and misrepresent our proposals." Despite 
this bitterness, Bridgeman was confident that the conference 
had not har-med Anglo-American relations. He found pleasure 
that the British had not "given anything away," and predicted 
that although the navalists in America would howl for more 
cruisers, he doubted that the failure would lead to renewed 
naval competition. The British First Lord also noted an 
improvement in Anglo .. ·Japanese relations growing out of the 
conference and felt this to be one of its positive legacies. ll 
The immediate result of the failure was the resignation 
of Viscount Cecil from the Cabinet. On 7 August he informed 
chamberlain of his intention to resign. 12 Chamberlain, sur-
prised at Cecil's seemingly abrupt decision, urged him to 
"rest for a week; then think it over again when you are less 
strained and tired.,,13 But Cecil had made up his mind and 
submitted his resignation to Baldwin on 9 August. In his 
letter of resignation Cecil stated that he had come to the 
IIBridgeman to Chamberlain, 7 August 1927, F.O. 800/261. 
12Cecil to Chamberlain, 7 August 1927, Ibid. 
l3Chamberlain to Cecil, 8 August 1927, Ibid. 
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conclusion that he had been "out of sympathy with the instruc-
tions I received, and I believe that an agreement might have 
been reached on terms which would have sacrificed no essential 
British interest.,,14 In further communication with Chamber-
lain Cecil disclosed another reason for his decision: there 
were basic and "profound differences between Churchill and 
himself." Cecil lamented that he had no hope of ever winning 
over "perhaps the most forceful personality in the Cabinet" 
who was openly against any agreement with the United States. lS 
Cecil's adversary had publicly restated his opposition 
to parity with the United States on 7 August: "We are unable 
now--and I hope at no future time--to embody in a solemn 
international agreement any words which would bind us to the 
principle of mathematical parity in naval strength.,,16 But 
while Churchill was strongly opposed to any formal concession 
of numerical parity, he had no objections to the United 
states' constructing any number of vessels it desired. He 
simply did not want the British tied to any agreement 
limiting their freedom of naval construction. Although Cecil 
probably had a right to feel bitter over Churchill's 
l4Cecil to Baldwin, 9 August, Ibid. Reprinted in Vis-
count Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1941), pp. 358-63. Cecil explained his 
decision further in Parliament on 16 November 1927, Great 
Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th 
series, 69 (1927): 84-94. 
lSCecil to Chamberlain, 10 August 1927, F.O. 800/261. 
l6London Times, 8 August 1927, p. 12. 
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opposition, Churchill should not be thought of as completely 
unreasonable in naval matters. For example, on 18 August 
Churchill expressed to Bridgeman his opinion that there 
should be a halt in British cruiser construction for the 
rest of 1927. Churchill recomm~nded that the Admiralty 
postpone its projected building program for 1927-1928 to 
save money, and also equally important to Churchill: "We 
should give every opportunity for the Navy party in the 
United States to cool down. • " Churchill was willing to 
let the United States build cruisers while the British marked 
time in order to improve relations between the two countries 
and thus prevent a naval race. 17 
Cecil's resignation, accepted with regret by Baldwin 
on 29 August, was met with glee in the United States. Be-
lieving that Cecil had "administered a black eye to British 
Toryism," editorialists concluded that the resignation served 
as a further indictment of the British position at Geneva. 18 
Hugh Gibson wondered why Cecil had not shown more flexibility 
at the conference if he felt the British government had been 
too rigid: "He seems to be making a poor spectacle of himself 
l7Winston Churchill to Bridgeman, 18 August 1927, F.O. 
800/261. 
18The Literary Digest 94 (17 September 1927) :8-10. 
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and [is] trying to place on others the blame for his own 
stubborness.,,19 Cecil's resignation also added more fuel to 
Labor Party attacks. On 24 November 1927, Ramsey MacDonald, 
leader of the Labor Party, introduced in the House of Commons 
a motion condemning the Conservatives for their failure to 
carry out adequate diplomatic preparations prior to the 
conference. Chamberlain was called forth to explain why he 
evidently "forgot to scout the field" before the event. 
MacDonald asserted there should have been more statesmen 
and fewer military officers in Geneva and declared that at a 
conference called to discuss broad issues "the service dele-
gat ion is altogether out of place.,,20 
Chamberlain defended the government. He answered 
MacDonald's second charge by stating that the British dele-
gation was the least military of the three delegations, con-
sisting of two Cabinet officials and an Admiral. Each of the 
other delegations contained two Admirals and one civilian. 
Chamberlain admitted that preparations might have been 
better. He argued that the opposition had repeatedly pressured 
him to "eschew secrecy, to trust public opinion to come frank-
ly out into the open and in face of all the world to state our 
19Gibson to his mother, 30 August 1927, Gibson Papers. 
20Great Bri tain, Parliamen,t, Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 5th series, 210 (1927) :2093, 2096. 
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view without any previous understanding ••• or other un-
derhanded arrangements." Now, Chamberlain asked, what had 
happened with this "new diplomacy"--failure. The foreign 
minister also stressed that the United States had called 
the conference, and it was thus her responsibility to ini-
tiate the diplomatic preparations. Great Britain's desire 
to negotiate, Chamberlain added, made them accept Coolidge's 
invitation without seeking information. 21 
Bridgeman was also called forth to defend the govern-
mente Staunchly supporting the foreign minister, Bridgeman 
declared that the British delegation had gone to Geneva 
"most carefully prepared. II As to criticism over the compo-
sition of the British delegation, the First Lord repeated 
Chamberlain's statement that the British had gone with two 
civilians and just one Admiral, as opposed to the other 
delegations. It seemed to him ridiculous to attend a con-
ference to discuss naval matters and take no naval advisors. 22 
Although Cecil's resignation caused the Baldwin Government 
problems, Chamberlain and Bridgeman asserted that in the 
final analysis their actions during the conference had been 
correct. 
Of the three countries, Japan seemed to come out of the 
21Ibid ., pp. 2102-03. 
22 b'd I 1. ., pp . 2187- 9 7 • 
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conference the least scathed. As mentioned earlier, Bridge-
man had been pleased with the Japanese performance at Geneva. 
Kellogg echoed these sentiments in a letter to the Japanese 
Ambassador, adding that the United States had found little 
difficulty in agreeing with Japan's proposals. 23 The Japa-
nese were disappointed with the results, but pleased in 
another respect--Great Britain's and America's bitter dif-
ferences meant there was little chance they would ally aginst 
Japan in the near future. Admiral Saito admitted privately 
that he would have liked to give more support to the British 
position during the conference, but had maintained a neutral 
attitude for political reasons. Evidently the Japanese gov-
ernment reasoned that any appearance of support for Great 
Britain would antagonize the United States and worsen 
matters. 24 During the early stages of the conference the 
Japanese press accused the other two powers of being selfish, 
but later supported the British whose naval situation seemed 
23FRUS , 1927, pp. 156-57. 
24Malcolm D. Kennedy, The Estrangement of Great Britain 
and Japan, 1917-35 (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), pp. 112-13. For more on the Japanese view of 
the conference see, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Diplomatic Com-
mentaries, Trans. by William R. Langdon (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1936), pp. 192-97. Unfortunately, Ishii's 
account is dissapointingly sketchy. 
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more similar to that of Japan. 25 
Soon after the conference ended Churchill pressed Bridge-
man to curtail the British naval building program. Bridgeman 
complied with Churchill's wishes and announced to the House 
of Commons on 16 November that the Admiralty would suspend 
construction on two of the three cruisers projected. 26 
Although President Coolidge stressed his desire not to renew 
the naval armaments race, after the conference he once again 
pressed for naval construction, but in an indirect manner. 
The President announced that the United States would 
continue its "ordinary building program" as if no conference 
had occurred. 27 On 16 August he stated that Congress should 
have authorized the ten cruisers he requested in December 
1926. Compliance would have allowed him to include in the 
1928 budget appropriations for the construction of new 
vessels. But Congress had chosen not to authorize any new 
cruisers and appropriated an insufficient amount for beginning 
work on three cruisers that had already been authorized. 28 
25 Ibid., p. 122. For examples of Japanese press com-
ments during and after the conference see, "Disarmament By 
Example," The Trans-Pacific 14 (16 July 1927) :5; "Japanese 
Press Views," Ibid. 14 (23 July 1927): 5; Shinnosuke 
Tanagisawa, "The Failure at Geneva," Ibid. 15 (1 October 
1972): 6. 
26Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 5th series, 210 (1927): 1013. 
27coo1idge Press Conferences, 9 August 1927. 
28 Ibid ., 16 August 1927. 
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In December Coolidge had not pressed strongly for the ten 
cruisers. But the failure of the conference angered him and 
he now sought to recover the lost time. The United States had 
the financial resources to construct new cruisers, while Great 
Britain desired a suspension of construction to ease its 
financial straits after the war. 29 
In his Annual Message, delivered on 6 December 1927, 
the President alluded only briefly to Geneva: "While the 
results of the conference were of considerable value, they 
were mostly of a negative character." Coolidge recognized 
that "no agreement can be reached which will be inconsistent 
with a considerable building program on our part ... 30 He was 
through with disarmament conferences and had decided to gain 
parity with Great Britain through construction instead of 
through limitation. 
On 14 December Representative Thomas Butler, Chairman 
of the House Naval Affairs Committee, introduced into the 
House a massive naval construction bill, which called for 
twenty-five cruisers, five aircraft carriers, nine destroyer 
leaders, and thirty-two submarines, all to be begun within 
29coolidge later qualified his remarks, stating that he 
had simply desired a continuation of the American Naval Pro-
gram, but of course it was "not a matter of great consequence 
as it is a matter of years to build them." Ibid., 19 
August 1927. 
30FRUS , 1927, p. viii. 
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the next five years and to be completed by 1937. 31 This 
"71-Ship Bill" would cost an estimated $725,000,000. The 
navalists were relying on presidential support and the 
general pro-Navy mood of the country for success in Congress. 
They were also relying on the work of the Navy League to 
apply the necessary pressure. 
The Navy League had formed after the Spanish-American 
war. Its basic purpose was to inform the public of the 
necessity for a strong navy. Composed of naval veterans, 
arms manufacturers, and politicians with shipbuilding con-
stituencies, the League gained in membership and strength 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century. During 
the 1920's the League fought naval disarmament and preached 
the importance of a large navy. After Geneva it once again 
geared its propaganda machine for passage of the Butler 
Bill. 32 There were, however, equally determined pacifist 
31New York Times, 15 December, 1927, p. 10. Arnold Toyb-
bee incorrectly dates this bill as being introduced on 14 
November, Toynbee, Survey, p. 81. 
32Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p. 112. Here-
after cited as Rappaport, Navy League. This author relied on 
Rappaport's treatment of the Navy League fight for passage of 
the naval appropriations bill. For further treatments of 
this subject see Hugh Latimer, Naval Disarmament (London: The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1930), pp. 48-51; 
Ttlilliam H. Gardner, "Naval Parity: The Outlook After Geneva," 
Harper's Monthly 156 (January 1928): 211-19. Hector Bywater 
expressed surprise in the large cruiser demands in the "71-
Ship Bill," stating this was quite an increase above the 
400,000-ton limit set at Geneva. Hector Bywater, "American 
Naval Policy," The Nineteenth Century and After 103 (March 
1928): 328. 
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groups. Led by the National Council for the Prevention of 
War, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, and 
The National Education Association, these organizations joined 
members of Congress who refused to be swayed by "swivel-chair 
navalists." There soon arose such a roar of indignation over 
the size of the bill that Butler was forced to pare his 
recommendations to fifteen heavy cruisers and one aircraft 
carrier. The House passed the bill in this form on 17 March 
1928, but the Senate adjourned in l1ay without considering the 
bill. The pacifists had won a temporary victory, and the Navy 
League realized the difficulty of maintaining public enthusiasm 
for the bill when Congress was not in session. Fortunately 
from the "Big Navy" standpoint, Great Britain rescued the 
Navy League through inept diplomacy. 
After a long and complicated series of diplomatic nego-
tiations, the British and French agreed during the summer of 
1928 to compromise their differences over disarmament. France 
yielded to the British on naval limitation in return for 
English withdrawal of its opposition to the French demand that 
reserves be omitted when calculating the strength of land 
forces. France further agreed to divide naval vessels into 
four categories: ~ capital ships, aircraft carriers, surface 
vessels of below 10,000 tons, and submarines. The British 
won their demand that no limit be placed on cruisers mounting 
six-inch guns; only cruisers carrying the large guns would be 
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limited. Upon being informed of the Anglo-French agreement, 
the Coolidge Administration denounced the whole agreement 
saying that the British had attempted to confront the United 
States with a fait accompli. The Americans believed that 
the British had sought to pressure them into concessions 
which they had been unable to obtain in direct negotiations 
at Geneva. 33 Coolidge cont'ributed to the decline in Anglo-
American relations with a strong defense of American naval 
needs in an Armistice Day speech in November 1928. Empha-
sizing the importance of protecting the trade routes and 
overseas possessions of the United States, Coolidge firmly 
maintained that "world standards of defense require us to 
have more cruisers." With this outspoken support from the 
President, the Navy League was able to gain passage of the 
amended naval bill on 5 February 1929. The bill became law 
on 13 February.34 
The American resumption of Naval construction greatly 
concerned the British. In a Foreign Office memorandum in 
April 1928, Austen Chamberlain cited the Geneva Conference 
with accentuating the "danger to good relations arising out 
of naval competition." He remained hopeful, however, that 
33Rappaport, Navy League, pp. 119-20. For more on the 
events leading up to the Anglo-French agreement see Latimer, 
Naval Disarmament, pp. 23-32. 
34New York Times, 12 November 1928, pp. 1-2. For the 
text of the naval bill see united States Statutes at Large, 
vol. 45, part I (December 1927-March 1929), 70th Congress, 
2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929), 
p. 1165. 
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relations could be improved basing this on the belief that 
the "American people is, as a whole, pacific in its out-
look.,,35 
It would take another year and a new president before 
naval disarmament was resumed. This time, however, the 
leaders of Great Britain and the United States played a more 
important part in the negotiations. Through a series of in-
formal discussion during 1929, Herbert Hoover and Ramsay 
MacDonald were able to reach tentative agreements on the 
sticky question of cruisers. In 1930, France, Italy, Japan, 
Great Britain, and the United States met to renew disarma-
ment deliberations. The Americans made a major concession 
and accepted 143,000 tons of smaller vessels with six-inch 
guns. But in return they obtained eighteen 10,000-ton 
cruisers, with Great Britain receiving fifteen. As compensa-
tion, the British were allowed 50,000 more total tons of the 
six-inch ships than the united States. Japan received a sixty 
percent ratio in the eight-inch gunships, a seventy percent 
total of the smaller vessels, and parity with America and 
35W• N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, eds., 
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series lA, 
Vol. 4 (Her"Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), p. 666. Cham-
berlain was still concerned a year later and noted in his re-
port for 1929 that "it is gravely-to be feared that a continu-
ation of the present deadlock will lead to American insistence 
upon superiority ..• n, W. N. Med1icott, Douglas Dakin, and 
M. E. Lambert, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
1919-1939, Series lA, Vol. 6 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1975), pp. 835-36. 
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Britain in submarines. In the other classes the specific 
provisions of the London Treaty were strikingly similar to 
the tentative agreements reached at Geneva in 1927. Cate-
gories exempted from restriction at Geneva were closely fol-
lowed by those left unlimited at London. The only change was 
an increase in the speed of exempt vessels from eighteen knots 
to twenty knots. The destroyer recommendations at Geneva 
were incorporated unchanged into the London agreement, and 
submarines were limited to 2000 tons and mounting 5.l-inch 
guns. This was only a minor change from the decisions at 
Geneva to limit submarines to 1800 tons and five-inch guns. 
Thus the provisions on auxiliary warships in the London Treaty 
were presaged in nearly every respect by the tentative ar-
rangements concluded at Geneva in 1927. 36 
In the years and decades since the Geneva Conference 
much has been written about how and why it failed. There have 
been nearly as many reasons given for the failure as there 
were writers giving them. Causes ranged from a lack of 
.pre-conference diplomatic preparation to the composition of 
36The best account of 1930 London Naval Conference is 
Raymond O'Connor's Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and 
The London Naval Conference of 1930 (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1962). 
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the delegations attending the meeting. 37 
One of the earliest to analyze the negotiations was the 
esteemed Arnold Toynbee. Toynbee produced not one, but four 
basic reasons for the failure. The first centered upon the 
inability of the negotiators to deal successfully with the 
problem of publicity. He concluded that the only effect of 
the closed sessions was inaccurate and sensational stories by 
an ignorant press. A second contribution was the role the Big 
Navy people played in influencing public opinion. Toynbee 
admitted that this effect was difficult to measure, but 
considered it an important factor. Third, the English 
37For examples of contemporary analysis of the confer-
ence failure see Frank Simonds, "Naval Disaster at Geneva" 
Review of Reviews 76 (27 September 1927): 270-75; "Geneva--
and After," The Spectator 139 (13 August 1927): 244; "The 
Naval Conference," Round Table 17 (September 1927): 659-83; 
John C. Skillock, Jr., "The Post-War Movements to Reduce 
Naval Armaments," International Conciliation: Documents for 
the Year, 1928 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 1928), pp. 619-39; Rennie Smith, liThe Break-
down of the Coolidge Conference," Contemporary Review 132 
(September 1927): 290-95; Hugh F. Spender, "The Riddle of the 
Cruisers," Fortnightly Review (1 September 1927): 317-25; 
Richard Hooker, "The Geneva Naval Conference," The Yale Review 
17 (January 1928): 263-80; K. K. Kawakami, "The Hidden Con-
flict at the Three-Power Naval Conference," Current History 27 
(October 1927): 106-11; J. B. Atkins, "Between Geneva and the 
Deep Blue Sea," The Independent 120 (4 February 1928); 104-6: 
"The End of the Naval Conference," The Outlook 146 (17 August 
1927): 497-8; Alfred C. Dewar, "The Geneva Conference, 1927," 
Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1928: 60-68. 
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historian placed blame on certain members of the Cabinet, 
such as Churchill, for remaining rigid in their desires not to 
concede parity to the Americans. Finally, and this Toynbee 
considered to be the major reason, was inadequate diplomatic 
preparation. The British and Americans brought to the 
conference proposals that had been drawn up with no exchange 
of information concerning their contents, causing a deadlock 
to form right from the start. 38 
P. J. Noel-Baker, writing in 1927 and a strong supporter 
of the League of Nations, cited two fundamental reasons for 
the ultimate breakdown. Primarily, Noel-Baker considered the 
separation of the conference from the workings of the League 
to have been a great mistake. Disarmament "to be successful 
must be general," and decisions made at any separate con-
ference would still affect all nations. Noel-Baker also 
blamed the secrecy of the meetings, saying that these closed 
sessions resulted only in a "multitude of varying and con-
flicting versions of the truth, from which distrust and mis-
understanding of every kind arise.,,39 
Salvador De Madriaga, another proponent of the League 
of Nations, agreed with Noel-Baker that the Geneva Conference 
38Toynbee, Survey, pp. 73-77. 
39p • J. Noel-Baker, Disarmament and the Coolidge Confer-
ence (London: Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1927), pp. 7-10. 
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had only been "a partial attempt" at disarmament. De Madriaga 
stressed that disarmament could succeed only through the ef-
forts of all nations working together toward the same end. 40 
Another writer during this post-conference period, while 
not an historian, was active in the naval affairs of Great 
Britain. Writing in 1928, Joseph Montague Kenworthy concluded 
that the responsibility for the failure must rest with Great 
Birtain. The British had tried to regain supremacy of the 
seas, lost at Washington, but had encountered a similar 
American attitude. Kenworthy also urged that at the next 
disarmament conference, the Admirals be left home. 41 
Rolland Chaput, writing in the mid-nineteen-thirties, 
attributed to the cruiser controversy the major cause of 
the breakdown. The British insistence on six-inch gun 
cruisers for their needs, coupled with their desire to 
maintain an equal number of eight-inch gun vessels with the 
United States caused the final collapse. 42 H. Wilson Harris 
40Sal vador De Ma<lar"iaga Disarmament {New York: Coward-
McCann, Inc., 1929, pp. 231-32. 
4lJoseph Montague Kenworthy Strabolgi and George Young, 
Freedom of the Seas (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1928), 
pp. 183-84. 
42Rolland A. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Pol-
icy (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1935), pp. 163-64. 
For similar conclusions see George T. Davis, A Navy Second to 
None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), pp. 323-34; Gio-
vanni Engely, The Politics of Naval Disarmament, trans. H. V. 
Rhodes (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1932), p. 41. 
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dismissed the conference as "an ill-starred affair" which 
"began badly and ended worse. II He placed the crux of the 
failure on the lack of preparation and the question of 
parity.43 
Benjamin H. Williams, while admitting that the con-
ference was successful in clearing the ground for a future 
Anglo-American agreement, was still critical of the compo-
sition of the delegations. He placed particular blame on the 
American delegation, stating that while Admiral Jones was 
indeed an expert on naval affairs, he still "viewed the world 
through a porthole." Viscount Cecil was credited with being 
the only representative with an outstanding reputation, but 
was unfortunately controlled by the British Cabinet. 44 
During the nineteen-forties Merze Tate produced a 
major monograph on disarmament. She concluded that the 
conference had tried to solve the problems from the technical 
standpoint without prior settlement of political differences. 
Recognizing that there had been a lack of pre-conference 
diplomatic preparation, Tate maintained that the fundamental 
cause for failure lay in Anglo-American divergence on naval 
43H. Wilson Harris, Naval Disarmament (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930), pp. 35, 41. 
44Benjamin H. Williams, The United States and Disarma-
ment (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press; 1931), pp. 166-68. 
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parity. Although both nations agreed to the basic principle, 
't 45 they could not agree on a formula to achieve ~ • 
In the last twenty years historians have been able to 
study the subject of disarmament in greater depth because of 
the availability of published and unpublished government 
documents. Utilizing State Department records, L. Ehtan Ellis 
concluded in his study of Frank B. Kellogg and American 
Foreign Relations, 1925-1929, that the conference failed 
principally because the United States and Great Britain 
entered the conference with "preconceived policies growing 
out of a conviction of naval need based on technical consid-
erations •••• " Since neither country would compromise its 
requirements for cruisers, the conference ended in deadlock. 46 
In a later work Ellis added that the American delegation with 
its preponderance of naval personnel also contributed 
materially to the failure. Ellis also suggested two possible 
reasons for the quality of the American delegation: (1) 
Coolidge and Kellogg had not devoted much time to the selec-
tion of the delegates because they were too involved in other 
concerns, such as the continuing Nicaraguan and Mexican prob-
lems; and (2) Kellogg and Coolidge's "sheer ineptitude in 
45Merze Tate, The United States and Armaments (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1948), pp. 145,156-58. 
46L • Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign 
Relations, 1925-1929, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1961). 
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estimating the complexity of the problem. ,,47 The latter 
explanation certainly has some merit. 
In his study of the 1930 London Naval Conference, Raymond 
O'Connor discounted the composition of delegates as a factor 
and charged that the British failure to grant the United 
States full parity made agreement impossible. In addition, 
O'Connor mentioned that adverse publicity and lack of pre-
liminary spade work also contributed to the conference 
failure. 48 Armin Rappaport analyzed the cruiser issue as the 
fundamental cause of the failure. The British desire for 
many small cruisers was completely unacceptable to the Ameri-
cans and agreement became impossible. 49 Finally, David 
Carlton, writing in 1968, and having researched extensively 
in the personal papers of the British participants, concluded 
that the aims of the two Anglo-Saxon powers at the conference 
were "fundamentally incompatible." The American desire for 
large cruisers unavoidably clashed with the British in-
sistence for unlimited numbers of cruisers. These technical 
considerations, Carlton states, were the bases of the nego-
tiations at Geneva and made success highly improbable. 50 
47L • Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968), pp. 
141-46. 
480 , Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, p. 18. 
49Rappaport, ~avy League, pp. 109-10. 
50David Carlton, "Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval 
Disarmament Conference of 1927," Political Science Quarterly 
82 (December 1968) :596-97. 
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During the nineteen-sixties two major works on naval 
policy in the inter-war period appeared, one on each side of 
the Atlantic. In his Prelude to Pearl Harbor Gerald Wheeler 
devoted an entire chapter to the Geneva Conference. Wheeler 
concluded that the negotiations "had little chance of success 
from the day of conception" and they proceeded in an "at-
mosphere of futility." Wheeler argued that two reasons were 
behind the lack-of preliminary groundwork. One was the 
State Department's belief that the knowledge gained from 
Jones' informal discussions with Beatty was sufficient for 
the conference, and therefore little else was needed. The 
other related to Coolidge's initial invitation. Since the 
conference had been planned only to supplement the ongoing 
work of the Preparatory Commission, the personnel chosen for 
the meeting were those already at Geneva. The State Depart-
ment reasoned that these individuals would simply continue 
the discussions already in progress at the Commission. 
Wheeler also contended that the United States was forced 
to negotiate from weakness at the Geneva Conference. The 
United States had only two lO,OOO-ton cruisers laid down, 
with the other six still in the planning stages. But Great 
Britain had fourteen under construction, and Japan had six. 
Without cruisers actually under construction, the United 
States had a difficult task convincing the other two nations 
that they should limit their navies, while the United States 
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could then go ahead and build up hers. Wheeler also blamed 
the General Board for its responsibility in this respect, 
charging it with intransigence regarding total cruiser 
tonnage and the arming of all vessels with eight-inch 
guns. 5l 
Wheeler based his main thesis, however, on his convic-
tion that Anglo-American concerns over the Japanese Navy and 
its activities in the Far East were lithe shoals upon which 
the conference grounded." Wheeler argued that both Great 
Britain and the United States had predicated their naval 
policy on the prospect of dealing with a belligerent Japan in 
the future. The United States had determined that it re-
quired the large cruisers to operate effectively in the 
expanses of the Pacific. Great Britain, in turn, had decided 
that the 5:3 ratio must be maintained with Japan, and if the 
united States were to require more large cruisers than Great 
Britain believed necessary for Japan, then the Admiralty 
would have to ask for a lower Japanese ratio. This would, of 
course, be impossible for Japan to accept, and thus, Wheeler 
concluded, the conference had to fail. 52 
5lGerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United 
State~ Navv and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columb1a, M1ssour1: 
University of Missouri Press, 1963), pp. 139-45. 
52 Ibid ., p. 150. 
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In contrast to Wheeler, Stephen Roskill discounted the 
significance of the lack of preparation in causing the failure 
of the conference. Instead, the well-known British naval 
historian laid most of the blame on the American doorstep. 
He emphasized the American infl.~xibility, its "Navy second 
to none dogma", and its "stubborn refusal to recognize that a 
maritime empire dependent on seaborne commerce could reason-
ably claim special needs for trade defense purposes • . • 
since it was remotely improbable that such vessels would ever 
be used against the United States." While stating that the 
selection of Admiral Jones as a delegate "was not exactly 
conducive to a settlement," Roskill found nothing wrong with 
Bridgeman and Cecil, who were "prepared to accept any reason-
able compromise in order to achieve agreement.,,53 
Roskill concluded that the fundamental cause of failure 
was the different strategic requirements of Great Britain and 
the United States in cruiser types and tonnage. Britain's 
stubborn refusal to accept a total cruiser tonnage of 400,000 
tons, coinciding with the American insistence on settling for 
53Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. 1: 
The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (New York. 
Walker and Company, 1968), pp. 59, 516. For a more recent 
criticism of the conference that shares Roskill's opinions 
see Norman Gibbs, "The Naval Conference of the Inter-War 
Years: A Study in Anglo-American Relations," Naval War 
College Review 30 (Summer 1977): 52-53. 
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nothing less than eight-inch guns on their ships, made total 
failure inevitable. Roskill added several collateral reasons 
contributing to the breakdown: the long, hot summers in 
Geneva and Washington; press "leaks" from the American dele-
gation; a lack of cordiality between Esme Howard and Kellogg, 
which probably hurt negotiations at the higher level; the 
anti-British propaganda of the Navy League; and, finally, the 
"back stairs activities" of William B. Shearer on the behalf 
of American steel and armament interests. 54 
Since the publication of Roskill's work in 1968, two 
dissertations have appeared. 55 Michael J. Brode, a Canadian 
writing in 1972, concluded that the conference failed 
principally because of the Anglo-American decision to follow 
"without significant compromise" the plans drafted by their 
respective navies. Brode also criticized the British and 
American refusal to compromise in 1927 when the Japanese had 
been desirous of agreement. The conference failure "con-
tributed to the weakening of civilian prestige and rise of 
militarism in Japan and forfeited a change to stabilize the 
54Roskill, Naval Policy, pp. 514-18. 
55For another view from the 1970's see Robert William 
Dubay, "The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: A Study of 
Battleship Diplomacy" The Southern Quarterly 8 (January 
1970): 177-99. 
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Asian situation.,,56 
In 1974, William Trimble expressed three basic reasons 
for the conference failure. Primarily, the breakdown was 
the result of British and American failure to conduct ade-
quate prior political discussions. Trimble placed most of 
the blame on the Americans, agreeing with Chamberlain that 
the responsibility for such discussion lay with the united 
States. Secondly, Trimble cited the inability of officials 
to compromise on the cruiser issue. He assigned to the 
deadlock over the gun calibre the major stumbling block in 
thi issue. Finally, he scored the United States for trying 
to gain concessions from the other two powers when it had 
nothing to bargain with from the beginning. Trimble also 
mentioned the secrecy of the meetings and the bad press given 
the British, but he discounted the latter, arguing that in 
most cases the American press reported the facts accurately.57 
After all of the words written about the Geneva Con-
ference in the past fifty years, one approaches with hesita-
tion the task of adding still another interpretation. Before 
beginning an assessment of the conference, it should be 
emphasized that contrary to what some historians have 
56Michael J. Brode, "Anglo-American Relations and the 
Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927," (Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Alberta, 1972), pp. 153, 162. 
57Trimble, "Geneva Conference," pp. 375-86. 
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claimed,58 the Geneva Conference was not a complete failure. 
Tentative agreements were reached on exempt vessels, sub-
marines, and destroyers. Even the vexatious cruiser issue 
was narrowed to the question of whether future vessels should 
be armed with 8-inch or 6-inch guns. Unfortunately, the 
united States and Britain remained adamant on the gun issue, 
and the possibility that further negotiations would have 
eventually solved the tonnage differences was lost. If 
nothing else, the conference at Geneva enabled the con-
flicting positions of the three countries to be placed in 
the open, where it soon became clear that concessions were 
essential on both sides if a naval arms limitation treaty 
was over to be consummated. 
The most common reason given for the failure at Geneva 
was the lack of preliminary diplomatic preparation. It 
cannot be denied that more diplomatic discussion would have 
improved the chances of success, but Kellogg and the State 
Department believed they had done what was necessary. 
Kellogg and Jones were bitter after the conference charging 
that the British had not been honest with them after giving 
58For examples see, Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington 
Conference and After: A Historical Survey (Stanford Uni-
versity, California: Stanford University Press, 1928), p. 147; 
Donald W. Mitchell, History of the Modern American Navy: From 
1883 Through Pearl Harbor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 
p. 326; Rappaport, Navy League, p. 109; Ellis, Frank B. 
Kellogg, p. 183; Wheeler, Pearl Harbor, p. 148. 
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supposed assurances to Jones during his trips to London that 
they would agree to parity. But Admiral Field had warned 
Jones in March 1927 that the British were considering the 
possibility of having more small cruisers because of their 
"special needs." Jones had not heeded this warning, and the 
British had gone ahead and drawn up their plans with the 
full intention of having their small cruisers. 
Contributing to the lack of diplomatic exchanges was the 
desire of both navies to keep their proposals secret. Both 
Beatty and Bridgeman wanted to have the advantage at Geneva 
that the Americans had enjoyed in Washington. Thus, each 
sought to keep their proposals secret until the first day of 
the conference. Although certainly a contributing factor, 
the lack of preparation was not the primary cause of the 
conference failure. 
Another reason advanced was the secrecy of the con-
ference meetings. The British charged that their views were 
being misrepresented by the American press. But when 
Bridgeman tried to set the record straight in his 30 June 
"parity" speech, he only succeeded in getting into trouble 
with the Caminet. The secret meetings, however, did serve 
the interests of men like William Shearer who played on 
the ignorance of the press to spread propaganda about the 
American position. Although some historians such as Stephen 
134 
Roski1l credit Shearer with causing the conference diffi-
cu1ties, Joseph H. Kitchens argues that "Shearer had little 
if any influence on, the [Geneva] negotiations. The strife 
he fomented only added to the unpleasantness of a conference 
that was hamstrung by the technical pre-suppositions of the 
two chief participants.,,59 During the conference there was 
little mention by the delegates of Shearer, and his impor-
tance in the final results was negligible. While recognizing 
that the negotiations might have been represented more cor-
rectly in the press, secrecy of the deliberations did enable 
the Japanese to translate the debates for those in their 
party who did not speak English. It is true that more diplo-
matic exchanges before the conference may have obviated the 
need for private sessions, but it is still doubtful if the 
secret meetings were crucial to the success of the conference. 
The composition of the delegations has also been pro-
posed frequently as a reason for the ultimate failure of the 
conference. The British, especially Bridgeman, criticized 
the American delegation for its preponderance of naval 
advisors. 60 Admittedly, Gibson was the only civilian of 
high rank in the American delegation, but Bridgeman's argu-
ment that the British had two civilians and only one naval 
5 9Ki tchens, "Shearer Scandal," p. 233. 
60William C. Bridgeman, "Naval Disarmament," Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 6 (November 1927): 335. 
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officer is not exactly correct. While Bridgeman was indeed 
a member of the Cabinet and thus a civilian, his position as 
First Lord of the Admiralty tended to color his perception 
of naval matters. Bridgeman was qui te close to Admiral Beatty, 
and in reality the British had one civilian, one Admiral, and 
one naval member with Cabinet rank. Chamberlain mentioned in 
his defense of the British delegation that the Japanese also 
had two Admirals and one civilian,61 Frederick Moore dis-
puted this assertion by the British Foreign Minister, noting 
that although Viscount Saito did hold the title of Admiral, 
he had long been one of Japan's foremost civilian adrninistra-
tors. 62 So, although it may be stated that the Americans had 
too many naval people, the other delegations also had their 
share of naval personnel. More important is the question of 
how much the final outcome of the conference would have 
been changed by more civilians and fewer military persons 
sitting at the conference table. The representatives to the 
conference had corne with the idea that technical questions 
were to be considered and an abundance of statesmen would 
not have contributed greatly to the discussions. By 1930, 
61Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
(Commons), 5th series, 210 (1927): 2102. 
62Frederick Moore, America's Naval Challenge (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 124. 
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however, this attitude had changed and the negotiations once 
again were handled by civilians with the military personnel 
acting in only an advisory capacity. 
Although these reasons all contributed in one way or 
another to the final breakdown, they were not the primary 
cause. The basic reason for the Anglo-American stalemate 
over the cruiser issue was caused by the "refusal of 
both sides to compromise its naval policies. Although after 
the conference charges flew back and forth across the At-
lantic, casting blame on the other nation, the fact remains 
that both sides were responsible for the final breakdown in 
the negotiations. The British Admiralty, strongly supported 
by Winston Churchill, was unbending in its desire for small 
cruisers to guard their extensive sea routes, while at the 
same time the Americans were equally adamant in their ad-
herence to the General Board Report, which called for parity 
with Great Britain and a minimum of eight-inch guns on all 
vessels. Although it is quite possible that an agreement could 
have been reached on the total tonnage for the cruiser class, 
obtaining agreement on the gun calibre issue became im-
possible. The British were steadfast in demanding that all 
future ships be armed with six-inch guns, which would of 
course, keep the British small cruiser from becoming obso-
lete. But the united States refused to recognize Great 
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Britain's "special needs," arguing that she also had needs 
that required the large cruiser and gun. The Navy also 
feared the British would place six-inch guns on their large 
merchantman fleet. This would increase the number of 
offensive ships in the British Navy and thus threaten the 
security of the United States. These rigid positions made 
compromise at Geneva impossible. 
There was another even more basic cause, often over-
looked, for the failure: the Coolidge Administration was not 
pressed to disarm. Coolidge's wish to cut Federal spending 
was based mainly on his desire to have a balanced budget. 
He had concluded that the military was one area where 
spending could be curtailed. The world was at peace and there 
was no immediate threat to the security of the United States. 
The President, thereby, hoped to join in European efforts to 
continue disarmament while also adding prestige to his 
administration. When the conference broke down, he decided to 
continue naval construction as if no conference had occurred. 
The British were more pressed for a reduction in naval 
armaments, but were reluctant to bargain with the Coolidge 
Administration on the finer points of the debate. Although 
needing to aid their economy wherever possible, the British 
were not eager to relinquish their naval security. An added 
factor was the British dislike ~ordealingwith Coolidge in 
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foreign affairs. Churchill had described the president as 
having the viewpoint of a "New England backwoodsman," and in 
the Conservative government the Exchequer had wielded great 
influence. The British were content to wait for a new 
president before tackling the disarmament problem again 
with the United States. 
The 1927 Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference was a per-
fect example of how not to conduct a conference. Begun with 
all proposals in the shadows, then proceeding into hopeless 
deadlock, the conference came to its only possible conclusion 
--failure. In 1927, neither the British nor the American 
naval personnel were willing to limit armaments in the quest 
of peace, and their leaders allowed them to have their way, 
By 19_30, however, both nati.ons were ready to take a chance to 
limit arms if it would help secure peace in a restless world. 
The negotiations had failed at Geneva, but the groundwork 
was laid for the successful conclusion of a naval limitation 
treaty in 1930. 
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